

# bulletin



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# *The Department of State* bulletin

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## Meeting of Heads of Government at Geneva

*Following are the texts of four statements by President Eisenhower at the Heads of Government meeting at Geneva, Switzerland, July 18-23, and the directive handed to the Big Four Foreign Ministers on the closing day of the Geneva meeting.*

### OPENING STATEMENT, JULY 18

Press release 435 dated July 18

We meet here for a simple purpose. We have come to find a basis for accommodation which will make life safer and happier not only for the nations we represent but for people elsewhere.

We are here in response to a universal urge, recognized by Premier Bulganin in his speech of July 15, that the political leaders of our great countries find a path to peace. We cannot expect here, in the few hours of a few days, to solve all the problems of all the world that need to be solved. Indeed, the four of us meeting here have no authority from others that could justify us even in attempting that. The roots of many of these problems are buried deep in war, conflicts, and history. They are made even more difficult by the differences in governmental ideologies and ambitions. Manifestly it is out of the question in the short time available to the Heads of Government meeting here to trace out the causes and origins of these problems and to devise agreements that could, with complete fairness to all, eliminate them.

Nevertheless, we can, perhaps, create a new spirit that will make possible future solutions of problems which are within our responsibilities. And, equally important, we can try to take here and now at Geneva the first steps on a new road to a just and durable peace.

The problems that concern us are not inherently insoluble. Of course, they are difficult; but their solution is not beyond the wisdom of man. They

seem insoluble under conditions of fear, distrust, and even hostility, where every move is weighed in terms of whether it will help or weaken a potential enemy. If those conditions can be changed, then much can be done. Under such circumstances I am confident that at a later stage our Foreign Ministers will be able to carry on from where we leave off to find, either by themselves or with others, solutions to our problems.

No doubt there are among our nations philosophical convictions which are in many respects irreconcilable. Nothing that we can say or do here will change that fact. However, it is not always necessary that people should think alike and believe alike before they can work together. The essential thing is that none should attempt by force or trickery to make his beliefs prevail and thus to impose his system on the unwilling.

The new approach we of this conference should seek cannot be found merely by talking in terms of abstractions and generalities. It is necessary that we talk frankly about the concrete problems which create tension between us and about the way to begin in solving them.

As a preface, may I indicate some of the issues I think we should discuss.

### The German Question

First is the problem of unifying Germany and forming an all-German government based on free elections. Ten years have passed since the German armistice, and Germany is still divided. That division does a grievous wrong to a people which is entitled, like any other, to pursue together a common destiny. While that division continues, it creates a basic source of instability in Europe. Our talk of peace has little meaning if at the same time we perpetuate conditions endangering the peace. Toward Germans, the four of us bear special responsibilities. While any conclusions we reach would be invalid unless supported by majority opinion in Germany, this prob-

lem should be a topic for our meeting here. Must we not consider ways to solve it promptly and justly?

In the interest of enduring peace, our solution should take account of the legitimate security interests of all concerned. That is why we insist a united Germany is entitled, at its choice, to exercise its inherent right of collective self-defense. By the same token, we are ready to take account of legitimate security interests of the Soviet Union. The Paris agreements contain many provisions which serve this purpose. But we are quite ready to consider further reciprocal safeguards which are reasonable and practical and compatible with the security of all concerned.

On a broader plane, there is the problem of respecting the right of peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live; and of restoring sovereign rights and self-government to those who have been deprived of them. The American people feel strongly that certain peoples of Eastern Europe, many with a long and proud record of national existence, have not yet been given the benefit of this pledge of our United Nations wartime declaration, reinforced by other wartime agreements.

There is the problem of communication and human contacts as among our peoples. We frankly fear the consequences of a situation where whole peoples are isolated from the outside world. The American people want to be friends with the Soviet peoples. There are no natural differences between our peoples or our nations. There are no territorial conflicts or commercial rivalries. Historically, our two countries have always been at peace. But friendly understanding between peoples does not readily develop when there are artificial barriers such as now interfere with communication. It is time that all curtains, whether of guns or laws or regulations, should begin to come down. But this can only be done in an atmosphere of mutual respect and confidence.

There is the problem of international communism. For 38 years now its activities have disturbed relations between other nations and the Soviet Union. Its activities are not confined to efforts to persuade. It seeks throughout the world to subvert lawful governments and to subject nations to an alien domination. We cannot ignore the distrust created by the support of such activities. In my nation and elsewhere it adds to distrust and therefore to international tension.

## **Armaments**

Finally, there is the overriding problem of armament. This is at once a result and a cause of existing tension and distrust. Contrary to a basic purpose of the United Nations Charter, armaments now divert much of men's effort from creative to nonproductive uses. We would all like to end that. But apparently none dares to do so because of fear of attack.

Surprise attack has a capacity for destruction far beyond anything which man has yet known. So each of us deems it vital that there should be means to deter such attack. Perhaps, therefore, we should consider whether the problem of limitation of armament may not best be approached by seeking—as a first step—dependable ways to supervise and inspect military establishments, so that there can be no frightful surprises, whether by sudden attack or by secret violation of agreed restrictions. In this field nothing is more important than that we explore together the challenging and central problem of effective mutual inspection. Such a system is the foundation for real disarmament.

As we think of this problem of armament, we need to remember that the present burden of costly armaments not only deprives our own people of higher living standards, but it also denies the peoples of underdeveloped areas of resources which would improve their lot. These areas contain much of the world's population and many nations now emerging for the first time into political independence. They are grappling with the urgent problem of economic growth. Normally they would receive assistance, particularly for capital development, from the more developed nations of the world. However, that normal process is gravely retarded by the fact that the more developed industrial countries are dedicating so much of their productive effort to armament. Armament reduction would and should insure that part of the savings would flow into the less developed areas of the world to assist their economic development.

## **Atoms for Peace**

In addition, we must press forward in developing the use of atomic energy for constructive purposes. We regret that the Soviet Union has never accepted our proposal of December 1953 that nations possessing stockpiles of fissionable material



should join to contribute to a "world bank" so as, in steadily increasing measure, to substitute cooperation in human welfare for competition in means of human destruction. We still believe that if the Soviet Union would, according to its ability, contribute to this great project, that act would improve the international climate.

In this first statement of the conference, I have indicated very briefly some of the problems that weigh upon my mind and upon the people of the United States and where solution is largely within the competence of the four of us. As our work here progresses, I hope that all of us will have suggestions as to how we might promote the search for the solution of these problems.

Perhaps it would be well if each of us would in turn give a similar indication of his country's views. Then we can quickly see the scope of the matters which it might be useful to discuss here and arrange our time accordingly.

Let me repeat, I trust that we are not here merely to catalog our differences. We are not here to repeat the same dreary exercises that have characterized most of our negotiations of the past 10 years. We are here in response to the peaceful aspirations of mankind to start the kind of discussions which will inject a new spirit into our diplomacy and to launch fresh negotiations under conditions of good augury.

In that way, and perhaps only in that way, can our meeting, necessarily brief, serve to generate and put in motion the new forces needed to set us truly on the path to peace. For this I am sure all humanity will devoutly pray.

#### **STATEMENT ON DISARMAMENT, JULY 21**

White House Office (Geneva) press release dated July 21

Disarmament is one of the most important subjects on our agenda. It is also extremely difficult. In recent years the scientists have discovered methods of making weapons many, many times more destructive of opposing armed forces—but also of homes and industries and lives—than ever known or even imagined before. These same scientific discoveries have made much more complex the problems of limitation and control and reduction of armament.

After our victory as allies in World War II, my country rapidly disarmed. Within a few years our armament was at a very low level. Then events

occurred beyond our borders which caused us to realize that we had disarmed too much. For our own security and to safeguard peace we needed greater strength. Therefore we proceeded to re-arm and to associate with others in a partnership for peace and for mutual security.

The American people are determined to maintain and, if necessary, increase this armed strength for as long a period as is necessary to safeguard peace and to maintain our security.

But we know that a mutually dependable system for less armament on the part of all nations would be a better way to safeguard peace and to maintain our security.

It would ease the fears of war in the anxious hearts of people everywhere. It would lighten the burdens upon the backs of the people. It would make it possible for every nation, great and small, developed and less developed, to advance the standards of living of its people, to attain better food and clothing and shelter, more of education and larger enjoyment of life.

Therefore the United States Government is prepared to enter into a sound and reliable agreement making possible the reduction of armament. I have directed that an intensive and thorough study of this subject be made within our own Government. From these studies, which are continuing, a very important principle is emerging to which I referred in my opening statement on Monday.

#### **Adequate Inspection and Reporting Essential**

No sound and reliable agreement can be made unless it is completely covered by an inspection and reporting system adequate to support every portion of the agreement. The lessons of history teach us that disarmament agreements without adequate reciprocal inspection increase the dangers of war and do not brighten the prospects of peace.

Thus it is my view that the priority attention of our combined study of disarmament should be upon the subject of inspection and reporting.

Questions suggest themselves.

How effective an inspection system can be designed which would be mutually and reciprocally acceptable within our countries and the other nations of the world? How would such a system operate? What could it accomplish? Is certainty against surprise aggression attainable by inspection? Could violations be discovered promptly and effectively counteracted?

We have not as yet been able to discover any scientific or other inspection method which would make certain of the elimination of nuclear weapons. So far as we are aware no other nation has made such a discovery. Our study of this problem is continuing. We have not as yet been able to discover any accounting or other inspection method of being certain of the true budgetary facts of total expenditures for armament. Our study of this problem is continuing. We by no means exclude the possibility of finding useful checks in these fields.

As you can see from these statements, it is our impression that many past proposals of disarmament are more sweeping than can be insured by effective inspection.

Gentlemen, since I have been working on this memorandum to present to this conference, I have been searching my heart and mind for something that I could say here that could convince everyone of the great sincerity of the United States in approaching this problem of disarmament. I should address myself for a moment principally to the delegates from the Soviet Union, because our two great countries admittedly possess new and terrible weapons in quantities which do give rise in other parts of the world, or reciprocally, to the fears and dangers of surprise attack.

#### **U.S. Proposal**

I propose, therefore, that we take a practical step, that we begin an arrangement, very quickly, as between ourselves—immediately. These steps would include:

To give to each other a complete blueprint of our military establishments, from beginning to end, from one end of our countries to the other; lay out the establishments and provide the blueprints to each other.

Next, to provide within our countries facilities for aerial photography to the other country—we to provide you the facilities within our country, ample facilities for aerial reconnaissance, where you can make all the pictures you choose and take them to your own country to study; you to provide exactly the same facilities for us and we to make these examinations—and by this step to convince the world that we are providing as between ourselves against the possibility of great surprise attack, thus lessening danger and relaxing tension. Likewise we will make more easily attainable a

comprehensive and effective system of inspection and disarmament, because what I propose, I assure you, would be but a beginning.

Now from my statements I believe you will anticipate my suggestion. It is that we instruct our representatives in the Subcommittee on Disarmament in discharge of their mandate from the United Nations to give priority effort to the study of inspection and reporting. Such a study could well include a step-by-step testing of inspection and reporting methods.

The United States is ready to proceed in the study and testing of a reliable system of inspections and reporting and, when that system is proved, then to reduce armaments with all others to the extent that the system will provide assured results. The successful working out of such a system would do much to develop the mutual confidence which will open wide the avenues of progress for all our peoples.

The quest for peace is the statesman's most exacting duty. Security of the nation entrusted to his care is his greatest responsibility. Practical progress to lasting peace is his fondest hope. Yet in pursuit of his hope he must not betray the trust placed in him as guardian of the people's security. A sound peace—with security, justice, well-being, and freedom for the people of the world—*can* be achieved, but only by patiently and thoughtfully following a hard and sure and tested road.

#### **STATEMENT ON EAST-WEST CONTACTS, JULY 22**

White House Office (Geneva) press release dated July 22

According to the adopted agenda, today we meet to discuss methods of normalizing and increasing the contacts between our nations in many fields. I am heartened by the deep interest in this question, which interest implies a common purpose to understand each other better. Unfortunately there exist unnecessary restrictions on the flow between us of ideas, of things, and of people.

Like other questions we have considered during the past 4 days, this one cannot be considered independently or in isolation. All are related by their direct importance to the general objective of lessening world fears and tensions.

To help achieve the goal of peace based on justice and right and mutual understanding, there are certain concrete steps that could be taken:

(1) To lower the barriers which now impede the interchange of information and ideas between our peoples.

(2) To lower the barriers which now impede the opportunities of people to travel anywhere in the world for peaceful, friendly purposes, so that all will have a chance to know each other face to face.

(3) To create conditions which will encourage nations to increase the exchange of peaceful goods throughout the world.

Success in these endeavors should improve the conditions of life for all our citizens and elsewhere in the world. By helping eliminate poverty and ignorance, we can take another step in progress toward peace.

#### **Communications and Travel**

Restrictions on communications of all kinds, including radio and travel, existing in extreme form in some places, have operated as causes of mutual distrust. In America, the fervent belief in freedom of thought, of expression, and of movement is a vital part of our heritage. Yet during these past 10 years even we have felt compelled, in the protection of our own interests, to place some restrictions upon the movement of persons and communications across our national frontiers.

This conference has the opportunity, I believe, to initiate concrete steps to permit the breaking down of both mild and severe barriers to mutual understanding and trust.

#### **Trade**

Now I should like to turn to the question of trade. I assume that each of us here is dedicated to the improvement of the conditions of life of our own citizens. Trade in peaceful goods is an important factor in achieving this goal. If trade is to reach its maximum capability in this regard, it must be both voluminous and worldwide.

The United Nations has properly been concerned in making available to the people of the underdeveloped areas modern technology and managerial abilities, as well as capital and credit. My country not only supports these efforts but has undertaken parallel projects outside the United Nations.

#### **Potential of Atomic Science**

In this connection the new atomic science possesses a tremendous potential for helping raise the standards of living and providing greater

opportunity for all the world. Worldwide interest in overcoming poverty and ignorance is growing by leaps and bounds, and each of the great nations should do its utmost to assist in this development.

As a result new desires, new requirements, new aspirations are emerging almost everywhere as man climbs the upward path of his destiny. Most encouraging of all is the evidence that, after centuries of fatalism and resignation, the hopeless of the world are beginning to hope.

But regardless of the results achieved through the United Nations effort or the individual efforts of helpful nations, trade remains the indispensable arterial system of a flourishing world prosperity. If we could create conditions in which unnecessary restrictions on trade would be progressively eliminated and under which there would be free and friendly exchange of ideas and of people, we should have done much to chart the paths toward the objectives we commonly seek.

By working together toward all these goals, we can do much to transform this century of recurring conflict into a century of enduring and invigorating peace. This, I assure you, the United States of America devoutly desires—as I know all of us do.

#### **CLOSING STATEMENT, JULY 23**

White House Office (Geneva) press release dated July 23

I welcome and warmly reciprocate the spirit of friendliness and good intent that have characterized the statements of the two preceding speakers [Prime Ministers Eden and Bulganin], but I do hope that my silence respecting certain of the statements made by the immediately preceding speaker [Bulganin] will not by any means be interpreted as acquiescence on my part. Far from it.

But it has seemed to me that in the closing minutes of this conference there is no necessity for me to announce to this conference and to the world the United States position on the important questions we have discussed. These I hope and believe have already been made clear. Therefore, it has not seemed particularly fitting once more to recite them in detail. Rather I content myself with some reflections on our work of the past week and an expression of some hopes for the future.

### **Followthrough Will Be Decisive**

This has been an historic meeting. It has been on the whole a good week. But only history will tell the true worth and real values of our session together. The followthrough from this beginning by our respective governments will be decisive in the measure of this conference.

We have talked over plainly a number of the most difficult and perplexing questions affecting our several peoples and indeed the peoples of the entire world. We did not come here to reach final solutions. We came to see if we might together find the path that would lead to solutions and would brighten the prospects of world peace.

In this final hour of our assembly, it is my judgment that the prospects of a lasting peace with justice, well-being, and broader freedom are brighter. The dangers of the overwhelming tragedy of modern war are less.

The work of our Foreign Ministers as they strive to implement our directives will be of great importance, perhaps of even more than what we have done here. Theirs is the task, reflecting the substantive policies of their governments, to reach agreement on courses of action which we here could discuss only in broad terms. I know we all wish them well. I trust we will all support the necessary adjustments which they may find our governments must make if we are to resolve our differences in these matters.

### **The Hope of All Mankind**

If our peoples, in the months and years ahead, broaden their knowledge and their understanding of each other, as we, during this week, have broadened our knowledge of each other, further agreement between our governments may be facilitated.

May this occur in a spirit of justice. May it result in improved well-being, greater freedom, and less of fear or suffering or distress for mankind. May it be marked by more of good will among men. These days will then indeed be ever remembered.

I came to Geneva because I believe mankind longs for freedom from war and rumors of war. I came here because of my lasting faith in the decent instincts and good sense of the people who populate this world of ours. I shall return home tonight with these convictions unshaken and with the prayer that the hope of mankind will one day be realized.

### **DIRECTIVE TO FOREIGN MINISTERS, JULY 23**

The Heads of Government of France, the United Kingdom, the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A., guided by the desire to contribute to the relaxation of international tension and to the consolidation of confidence between states, instruct their Foreign Ministers to continue the consideration of the following questions with regard to which an exchange of views has taken place at the Geneva Conference, and to propose effective means for their solution, taking account of the close link between the reunification of Germany and the problems of European security, and the fact that the successful settlement of each of these problems would serve the interests of consolidating peace.

1. *European Security and Germany.* For the purpose of establishing European security with due regard to the legitimate interests of all nations and their inherent right to individual and collective self-defence, the Ministers are instructed to consider various proposals to this end, including the following: A security pact for Europe or for a part of Europe, including provision for the assumption by member nations of an obligation not to resort to force and to deny assistance to an aggressor; limitation, control, and inspection in regard to armed forces and armaments; establishment between East and West of a zone in which the disposition of armed forces will be subject to mutual agreement; and also to consider other possible proposals pertaining to the solution of this problem.

The Heads of Government, recognizing their common responsibility for the settlement of the German question and the re-unification of Germany, have agreed the settlement of the German question and the re-unification of Germany by means of free elections shall be carried out in conformity with the national interests of the German people and the interests of European security. The Foreign Ministers will make whatever arrangements they may consider desirable for the participation of, or for consultation with, other interested parties.

#### *2. Disarmament*

The Four Heads of Government,

Desirous of removing the threat of war and lessening the burden of armaments,

Convinced of the necessity, for secure peace and for the welfare of mankind, of achieving a system



for the control and reduction of all armaments and armed forces under effective safeguards,

Recognizing that achievements in this field would release vast material resources to be devoted to the peaceful economic development of nations, for raising, their well-being, as well as for assistance to underdeveloped countries,

Agree:

(1) for these purposes to work together to develop an acceptable system for disarmament through the Sub-Committee of the United Nations Disarmament Commission;

(2) to instruct their representatives in the Sub-Committee in the discharge of their mandate from the United Nations to take account in their work of the views and proposals advanced by the Heads of Government at this Conference;

(3) to propose that the next meeting of the Sub-Committee be held on August 29, 1955, at New York;

(4) to instruct the Foreign Ministers to take note of the proceedings in the Disarmament Commission, to take account of the views and proposals advanced by the Heads of Government at this Conference and to consider whether the four Governments can take any further useful initiative in the field of disarmament.

### *3. Development of Contacts between East and West*

The Foreign Ministers should by means of experts study measures, including those possible in organs and agencies of the United Nations, which could (a) bring about a progressive elimination of barriers which interfere with free communications and peaceful trade between people and (b) bring about such freer contacts and exchanges as are to the mutual advantage of the countries and peoples concerned.

4. The Foreign Ministers of the Four Powers will meet at Geneva during October to initiate their consideration of these questions and to determine the organisation of their work.

## **Training Program for Paraguayan Farm-to-Market Road**

The Foreign Operations Administration announced on June 27 that it will provide \$100,000 to train Paraguayans in the use and maintenance of highway construction equipment as an adjunct to the building of an important dry-weather road through the rich agricultural Chaco area of western Paraguay. The funds will also be used for a small amount of equipment.

The Chaco Road, to run a distance of 250 miles between Asunción and Filadelfia, is the result of an agreement between the Government of Paraguay, Chaco ranchers, and Mennonite colonists to provide \$300,000 for its construction. Asunción is the capital of Paraguay; Filadelfia, hub of the Mennonite colonies. It is hoped the road eventually can be extended to Villa Montes, Bolivia, as the first major access road between the two countries.

The Mennonites, a denomination of evangelical Protestant Christians who number about 12,000 in Paraguay, have successfully colonized a large area in the interior during the past 25 years. They have been so successful in their agricultural venture that the Government of Paraguay has authorized them to take all possible steps to fulfill goals set in a recent trade treaty with Bolivia.

The greatest problem confronting the Chaco Mennonites is the lack of good transportation facilities to carry their products to market. Crops must now be transported to Asunción by a long and devious route, by truck, railroad, and boat.

The service of an Foa engineer in the layout and construction of the Chaco Road will be provided under a cooperative agreement with the Paraguayan Ministry of Public Works, Mennonite authorities, and Chaco ranchers. Every 6 months the supervising engineer, assisted by a group of skilled Mennonites, will train a crew of workers, who will then be assigned to roadbuilding projects throughout Paraguay. Initial concentration will be on the training of crews for the Chaco Road.



## Basic Issues in the NATO Status of Forces Agreement

*Statement by Deputy Under Secretary Murphy<sup>1</sup>*

Let me begin with a word about the testimony which the committee has heard until now. The Department of State—and I am sure I can speak also for the Department of Defense in this regard—fully sympathizes with the concern expressed by the witnesses who have appeared before this committee. It is not, I trust, necessary to say that this concern for the members of our forces is fully shared by the Department of State and by the Department of Defense. Their welfare, indeed, is not only our concern but our responsibility.

Unfortunately, some of the statements made before this committee, and much that has appeared in public print, reflect basic misconceptions and misinformation. Our efforts to inform the American people on the very important matter with which this committee is concerned have apparently been less successful than we had hoped. It is for that reason that the Department is particularly grateful for the opportunity you have offered this morning to inform and to explain to this committee, and to the American people, what are the basic issues involved, what is the legal situation, and what are the facts.

By way of preface to my remarks, let me summarize what we believe to be the situation. We believe that the arrangements we do have are, in general, the best that we can obtain today. We believe that maintaining these arrangements, while remaining ever on the alert to protect the individual member of our forces against possible

error or abuse, is in the national interest. We believe that these arrangements are reasonable and practicable and represent considerable concessions to the viewpoint of the United States by our allies. We believe that the experience to date—which the representative of Defense is prepared to summarize for you—shows that our status-of-forces arrangements have worked in favor of the members of our military forces abroad.

This experience, as you will see, shows how small is the percentage of servicemen tried by foreign courts and how few of these were actually sent to jail. As to the handful who went to jail, we can say this: In every one of these cases a United States representative carefully followed the trial. In not one of these cases do we believe that an innocent man has gone to jail. In not one of these cases did we feel warranted in objecting that there had been an unfair trial. In not one of these cases was there cruel or unusual punishment. In not one of these cases can we say that the sentence meted out was substantially more severe than that which would probably have been imposed by a United States court martial.

In the history of American treaty-making there have been few agreements more carefully and painstakingly negotiated than the NATO Status of Forces Agreement.<sup>2</sup> There are few agreements which have received more widespread support from military and diplomatic officials familiar with the circumstances. The terms of the agreement were worked out by diplomatic and military officials of two administrations. The treaty was

<sup>1</sup> Made before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs on July 19 (press release 440) at public hearings on H. J. Res. 309 and similar resolutions providing for revision of the NATO Status of Forces Agreement and other agreements relating to criminal jurisdiction over members of the armed forces serving overseas.

<sup>2</sup> S. Exec. T, 82d Cong., 2d sess. For text, see *Treaties and Other International Acts Series* 2846. For an announcement of the signing of the treaty, see *BULLETIN* of July 2, 1951, p. 16.

presented to the Senate by President Eisenhower<sup>3</sup> and received his full support, as well as that of Secretary Dulles, and Secretary Wilson, General Bradley, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Ridgway, Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, and Admiral McCormick, Supreme Allied Commander in the Atlantic. In the Senate the treaty received careful consideration, much of it centering on the issue of criminal jurisdiction with which you are now concerned. The Senate approved the treaty by a 72-15 vote. Among its supporters were Senator Knowland, Senator Taft, Senator George, and Senator Johnson. Yet there is today a certain amount of confusion concerning the meaning of the status-of-forces treaty.

### Background of Agreement

Earlier in the hearings members of this committee expressed an interest in how the NATO status-of-forces treaty came about. When the United States decided that the defense of this country and of the free world required the stationing of American forces on foreign soil, we were concerned to assure these forces the maximum protection possible. Recognizing that, unless there were agreements with the governments concerned, our troops might be subjected to local jurisdiction for all kinds of offenses, even those committed while the serviceman was on duty, bilateral arrangements were negotiated. These were interim arrangements in the form of executive agreements, varying from country to country. The lack of uniformity and the interim character of the arrangements raised problems in various countries. When the North Atlantic Treaty came into force and an integrated Western defense was begun, it became clear that a more formal and more permanent definition of status was necessary. Everyone agreed that it should be arrived at on a uniform and multilateral basis. It was also necessary to deal with many other subjects, such as travel, customs, taxes, civil claims, etc. (In the NATO status-of-forces treaty the article on criminal law is only 1 of 20.)

The status of forces of one friendly power in the country of another in time of peace had already been the subject of negotiation among the countries of Europe. The Brussels Agreement of 1949

governing the status of forces of Western Union powers had established a precedent which the European countries thought should be continued in the NATO framework. This became the basis for study, but the United States sought to assure greater protections for our servicemen.

The countries involved in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization believe that their system of justice is civilized and fair. They were not willing to recognize an extralegal status for forces of other friendly states. Although some of them feel as strongly as we do about protecting the members of their forces, they were willing, in the common defense, to send forces to friendly states, recognizing that they would be subject to the jurisdiction of those states, within certain limitations to be established in the status-of-forces treaty, and they believed that the other NATO members should be willing to do likewise.

The United States sought to obtain for its forces the maximum privileges and protection possible. We sought and obtained more, in most countries, than was granted by the interim arrangements. Of course, we could not ask, in a multilateral agreement, for provisions which we were not prepared to grant in the United States. We believe that the NATO status-of-forces treaty was, and is, in the circumstances the best possible multilateral agreement obtainable.

One principal source of confusion about the criminal jurisdiction provisions, I believe, is the notion that the treaty gave away something—that it surrendered certain rights and privileges to which American servicemen would otherwise have been entitled. Now this idea is simply not true. It is without foundation. The contrary is true. As Attorney General Brownell has testified, the treaty gained certain important rights and privileges for American servicemen abroad that they would not otherwise possess. That was one of the principal purposes of the treaty, and that has been its principal effect.

The major criticism directed against the criminal jurisdiction provisions of the treaty stems from the fact that, under its terms, foreign law-enforcement agencies retain a measure of jurisdiction over American servicemen who are accused of crimes. Somehow, the idea arose that the treaty gave foreign governments this criminal jurisdiction. This idea seems to be based on the false premise that the soldiers of one country who are stationed in another country normally remain

<sup>3</sup> For statements in support of the agreement at the time of its submission to the Senate, see *ibid.*, Apr. 27, 1953, p. 628.

under the exclusive jurisdiction of their commanders and are not subject to local laws. I understand that certain American judicial opinions have been cited to support this view.

#### **Views of Justice Department**

The committee will hear from the representative of the Department of Justice. I should like, nevertheless, to read the committee Attorney General Brownell's conclusions about the treaty. Before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee considering the treaty, he said, in part:

... we believe that this does not change the rule of international law to the detriment of any American citizen.

Now our second conclusion is that the treaty affords to our forces abroad more immunity from local criminal jurisdiction than they would have in the absence of an agreement.

Our third conclusion is that this treaty affords our forces abroad more immunity than is afforded under the agreements which we think are directly comparable.

And our final conclusion is that the treaty gives to the members of our forces when they are to be tried in the courts of the receiving state adequate safeguards in accordance with civilized standards of justice.

Even if the legal conclusions were disputable, however, we cannot escape the hard facts. The governments of allied countries—the governments directly concerned here—certainly do not recognize legal doctrines like that suggested. They are sovereign nations. As such, they have criminal jurisdiction over every individual accused of offenses within their boundaries—whether soldier or civilian, whether citizen or alien—unless they voluntarily choose to waive this jurisdiction. Under longstanding custom they have waived it in the case of certain diplomatic officials. Under wartime conditions they have sometimes waived it with respect to allied military personnel. Under the Status of Forces Agreement they have waived a considerable part of their jurisdiction with respect to allied soldiers stationed in their country in peacetime. But the choice always lies with the sovereign host government. If it does not waive its jurisdiction or modify it, it retains jurisdiction, and this applies to soldiers as well as to tourists and businessmen who are visiting its country.

In the absence of the status-of-forces treaty or other voluntary waiver, therefore, these governments would have the right to arrest and try any American accused of criminal offenses within

their borders. If the treaty now existing should be revoked, that is exactly the situation that would immediately come into being. For this reason, it is entirely incorrect to argue that, if we got rid of the status-of-forces treaty, the rights of American soldiers abroad would be restored. As Attorney General Brownell said, without the NATO agreement our forces would have much less and would be worse off.

Now, in view of the fact that foreign governments normally have full jurisdiction over military and civilian personnel within their boundaries, there are some who recognize that the treaty has added substantially to the protection afforded American servicemen but who nevertheless argue that allied governments should have gone even further than they did. They believe that the United States Government, in return for assigning soldiers, sailors, and airmen abroad, should demand that allied governments completely surrender their criminal jurisdiction over these troops. In effect, they seem to be saying that American forces are sent abroad as a special favor to allied nations and that these nations ought to be willing to give up a part of their sovereign authority in payment for this favor. If these governments are unwilling to do this, it is argued, the United States should withdraw its troops.

#### **NATO Forces and Collective Security**

This argument raises the gravest issues of foreign policy and national security. This committee has by its action on legislation indicated its understanding of the reasons for stationing American servicemen abroad and of the international circumstances which make this action essential to our national safety. Nevertheless, it may be useful to review briefly some of the basic principles upon which the NATO alliance is founded. The Status of Forces Agreement can only be understood within the context of the broader collective security system of which it is a part.

This country long ago accepted the fact that the only true security available in this modern world is collective security. The Congress has demonstrated time and again its recognition of this proposition. We have entered alliances with many countries throughout the world, not just to protect other nations but also to protect ourselves. One of the most important of these alliances is the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Our NATO

allies have raised sizable military forces and now have more men under arms than we do. They are producing military equipment and supplies in significant quantities. They have provided many important ports and bases for the common defense. While the United States Government has contributed substantial amounts in money and equipment to support their defense efforts, these governments are paying most of the cost themselves. As a result they are supplying more military power to supplement and reinforce American defense efforts than we can find anywhere else in the world. NATO represents our first line of defense, and the degree of its effectiveness has a tremendous impact upon the dependability of our own national defense system. To put it simply, the success of NATO may make the difference between war and peace—may some day determine whether millions of Americans will live or die.

#### **U.S. Troops Indispensable to NATO**

As part of our contribution to the NATO partnership, we have stationed a sizable number of U.S. military forces in Europe. While these forces are a minority of the total, their presence is indispensable to NATO. In political and psychological terms their presence demonstrates our continuing determination to participate actively in the Atlantic defense system. In military terms they represent a body of trained and skilled manpower for which no substitution from European sources is practical. They operate ports and air bases and other technical facilities which are vital to effective defense in modern warfare. Our allies want these troops to stay in Europe. We recognize the need to have them there. They are part of an overall pattern of defense which could not be disrupted without fatal injury to the entire structure.

The important point for us to remember is that American troops are not in Europe as a favor to our allies. Their principal purpose is to protect the United States itself. They are there because we know that we can get more total protection by combining our strength with that of other nations than by standing alone. They are there because we want to prevent war altogether—to stop it before it starts. And if war comes despite our best efforts to prevent it, these military forces are in the place where they can do the most good—where they can help to halt an enemy attack and to retaliate with immediate and devastating effect. No credence is

given today to the idea that American soldiers, sailors, and airmen can best protect American citizens by staying at home and waiting for an enemy to strike the United States.

Let me repeat—American troops are not in allied countries as a favor to our allies. We know this, and our allies know it. It would be ridiculous for us to try to pretend that our troops are there just to help them. It is impossible for us to say, "Put Americans above the law or we'll go home," because it is not in our own interest to go home, any more than it is in their interest for us to go home. Only one interest would be served by the withdrawal of American forces from Europe, and that is the interest of Communist imperialism.

The Communists themselves are well aware of this fact. Most of you know, I am sure, that the Communists have labored increasingly to get American troops out of Europe. You will note that one key element of most recent Soviet proposals is to eliminate U.S. bases in Europe and to get American troops out. Local Communist parties are constantly carrying on propaganda campaigns to convince the local population that American soldiers should go home. They are constantly trying to stir up trouble between our troops and local citizens. They know that Europeans have bad memories of previous military occupation, and so they try to pretend that our troops are "occupation forces." To support this theme, the Communists steadily criticize local officials for giving privileges to American troops and argue loudly that the Status of Forces Agreement has given away *too much* of the local government's authority. Adding all these things together we can see clearly that the withdrawal of American forces from Europe is a major Communist objective, because they know that such action would weaken American defense as well as European defense.

In the context of the mutual defense program conducted through NATO, I believe the Status of Forces Agreement can be viewed in better perspective. NATO has not only led to the stationing of American troops in Europe; it has also made necessary the stationing of troops from several European countries in other European countries. One aspect of the Mutual Security Program involves the assignment of thousands of allied servicemen to the United States each year for special training. All these exchanges of military personnel



inevitably produce certain administrative and personal problems. In wartime, most of these problems seem relatively minor. When soldiers are dying every day under enemy fire, there is little tendency to worry very much about secondary sacrifices and inconveniences. In peacetime, however, it is more difficult for people to accept the necessity of these inconveniences. It is sometimes hard to realize the full importance of success on our part in fighting the "cold war"—in conducting a dynamic peace effort to prevent war.

#### **Criminal Jurisdiction of Host Government**

It is natural that we should try to minimize the personal difficulties that result from the stationing of troops of certain NATO countries in other NATO countries. One of the most thorny problems is that of criminal jurisdiction. Under normal circumstances, as we have seen, the sovereign host government has criminal jurisdiction. In the absence of waiver by the host country, military personnel would be subject to local jurisdiction, as are local citizens or visiting businessmen or tourists. The United States Government believes that these military personnel deserve special protection. Most allied governments agree with this principle. During World War II, in fact, there were various legislative enactments and special agreements that provided special protection. However, as the time for the expiration of these wartime agreements drew near, it became necessary for the NATO governments to work out new arrangements which would afford protection to individual servicemen consistent with the sovereign authority of the host countries. It is strangely ironic that this effort should later have been interpreted as a denial or surrender of American rights, when in fact American servicemen have gained substantial advantages.

Let's take a look at some of these advantages. In the first place, the Status of Forces Agreement provides that United States servicemen remain under United States jurisdiction with respect to offenses committed while on duty. In other words, foreign governments have voluntarily limited their jurisdiction to criminal offenses occurring while soldiers are off duty, on leave, or a. w. o. l. President Eisenhower once addressed himself to this important feature of the agreement. He said, in effect, that he believed servicemen deserved special treatment while carrying out their assign-

ments but that, when these servicemen were on leave and were following personal interests, they should be subject to the same basic responsibilities as other citizens.

Next, even if a serviceman is accused of an offense during his off-duty hours, United States authorities have the right to request local law enforcement agencies to waive jurisdiction and turn the man over to the United States military commanders for trial and punishment. The treaty provides that the local authorities shall give sympathetic consideration to such requests. As the representative of the Department of Defense will be prepared to testify, jurisdiction has been waived voluntarily in the overwhelming majority of cases.

Finally, in those cases where the local authorities believe they must retain criminal jurisdiction, the Status of Forces Agreement guarantees certain basic rights to the American serviceman. They are comparable to the safeguards which the serviceman would enjoy in a United States court martial. For example, he has the right to counsel. He has the right to confrontation by witnesses. He has the right to use of compulsory process for the purpose of obtaining witnesses in his own behalf. He has the right to contact United States military authorities. He has the right to have United States officials present at his trial when rules of the court permit, and in practice a United States representative has never been barred from the trial. Attorney General Brownell has testified that these provisions add up to "adequate safeguards in accordance with civilized standards of justice." These and other rights would not necessarily be available if the Status of Forces Agreement did not exist.

#### **Results of the Agreement**

It has often been said that "the test of the pudding is in the eating." I think all of you are undoubtedly interested in knowing how the agreement has worked out in actual practice. The detailed information will be presented by the Department of Defense. However, I should like to summarize in general terms the results of the agreement thus far.

In general, both the Department of State and the Department of Defense agree that the status-of-forces arrangements have worked unusually well. This view is supported by the commanders in the field. Some commanders apparently feel



that the local courts have actually been too lenient on American offenders. As I have said, of the very small number who were sentenced to prison by a foreign court there was not a single case in which we have a clear feeling that a court martial would have given a *lighter* sentence than that imposed by the local court. There was not a single case in which there was a basis for the United States to protest that the safeguards assured by the Status of Forces Agreement for a fair trial were not met, or that there was any other unfairness. There has been not a single instance of cruel or unusual punishment. A United States representative has been present at every one of the trials in these cases.

Of the many American servicemen, military employees, and dependents sent abroad, where the NATO status-of-forces treaty applied, there have been approximately 6,000 cases which fell within the primary jurisdiction of the local courts. In some 70 percent of these cases the local authorities have either dropped the charges entirely or waived jurisdiction voluntarily and have surrendered the accused person to United States military authorities. In the very large majority of the cases where Americans have stood trials, the courts have either found the accused innocent or have only imposed a fine. Out of the many hundreds of thousands of service personnel abroad, out of a total of 6,000 cases, only 85 persons have been imprisoned by local authorities in NATO countries, and, as of May 31, 1955, only 22 were actually in prison in these countries. Most of these sentences have been very short. The maximum sentence thus far imposed is 5 years for highway robbery with violence at night by two men against an old taxi driver.

#### **Offenses Arousing Strong Local Feeling**

You will note from the figures mentioned that local authorities have usually been quite willing to grant waivers of jurisdiction. In many instances, one might say, the cases for which we have been unable to obtain waivers and which have led to sentences of imprisonment have involved offenses arousing strong local feeling. Even in these cases, the courts have acted with moderation and have often been criticized for doing so. A British newspaper, for example, complained bitterly several months ago that an American soldier normally gets fined 10 shillings for an offense which

would cause a local citizen to spend 6 months in jail. I do not know whether this complaint is justified but I mention it to illustrate that there are definitely two sides to this question. When an American soldier assaults, robs, or murders a local citizen, you have a political and emotional problem on your hands that is not too easy to settle unless it is handled in a spirit of justice and mutual understanding.

I have concentrated on the NATO countries and the NATO Status of Forces Agreement because of the importance of NATO in our foreign policy, as well as because the resolution introduced in the House of Representatives also concentrated on the NATO status-of-forces treaty. In fact, there are more or less formal arrangements governing the status of our forces wherever they are stationed. Some of these agreements or arrangements must remain confidential. Let me explain. These arrangements are not classified at our request because of any desire by the executive branch to keep something hidden. They are classified at the request of the other governments involved largely because of the generosity of these arrangements to our forces. We could not, of course, reveal a classified international agreement without the consent of the other party. Nor is it in our interest to publicize these favorable arrangements. To do so would jeopardize the arrangements and render it unlikely that our servicemen could continue to enjoy the benefits which they confer. We can assure the committee that the arrangements generally have worked no less favorably to the interests of our servicemen than the NATO Status of Forces Agreement.

As to the experience in the non-NATO countries generally, the Department of Defense will be able to give you the figures and facts; in general, the experience is the same as or, in some cases, even better than in the NATO countries, both as regards the high percentage of waivers and the fairness of treatment.

#### **Civilians Seldom Have Immunity**

Questions have been raised before this committee about the diplomatic status of State Department and other civilian officials. In the first place, it should be made clear that the great majority of State Department personnel overseas do not have immunity from local criminal jurisdiction. On the contrary, most United States

civilian officers and employees abroad, including those of other governmental agencies as well as the State Department, have neither immunity nor the special guaranties provided United States servicemen by the Status of Forces Agreement. They are completely subject to local criminal jurisdiction, whether on duty or off duty.

A small minority possesses diplomatic immunity by long custom and tradition. This immunity is granted not for the advantage of the individual but for the benefit of the government he is representing, and the government can waive, and has waived, the immunity. And our diplomatic personnel are often required to live and work in hostile lands where immunity is essential to their work and to their safety. This immunity is enjoyed by a small number of people who, in fact, represent their government, and military officers who represent the United States (e. g., our MAAG [Military Assistance Advisory Group] officers) also enjoy diplomatic status.

Incidentally, nobody has diplomatic immunity except in the country to which he is accredited. So, even Secretary Dulles does not strictly have diplomatic immunity when he is abroad, since he is not accredited to any of the governments. And even an ambassador has diplomatic immunity only where he is accredited, not when he is on vacation in another country. A diplomatic passport by itself gives no immunity from jurisdiction.

### **Theoretical Alternatives**

As I see it, there are three theoretical alternatives suggested, or implied, by those who attack the treaty. None of them is good.

First, we might try to revoke the treaty. Even if we were willing to ignore the solemn commitment undertaken by the United States with the overwhelming consent of the Senate, it should be clear that revocation of the agreement—or denouncing it—would not be an acceptable alternative. Revocation or denunciation would merely leave foreign jurisdiction undiminished and remove the guaranties now assured to an individual serviceman. I don't think anyone desires this result.

The second alternative is to withdraw American forces from NATO. This action would make no sense either in terms of our foreign policy or our national defense. It would play into the hands of the Communists and permit them to

achieve one of their most eagerly sought objectives. It would gravely weaken Europe and gravely weaken our own security. I think it would be a catastrophe for free nations to wreck their entire system of collective defense simply because of their inability to agree on reasonable arrangements for handling an admittedly difficult legal and administrative problem. Nothing could do more to justify the ancient Communist theory that the free nations are incapable of long-term cooperation and will eventually be divided by conflicts among themselves. Nothing could do more to free the Soviet empire from the fear that any aggression on its part will be met by instantaneous retaliation—a fear that has served as a powerful deterrent to Soviet aggression.

The third alternative, of course, would be to try to negotiate a new agreement. Because of a widespread feeling in many areas that allied authorities have been excessively lenient toward Americans, political pressures might cause a new agreement to be considerably less favorable to United States servicemen. In any event, it can be safely predicted that a new agreement would not solve the fundamental problem posed by the critics of the present agreement—that allied governments would not surrender all criminal jurisdiction over American forces. For just a moment, let us look at this problem from their viewpoint.

Our allies know, as we do, that the cold war may continue for a long time. We all hope that we will be able to maintain a collective defense system as long as the threat exists. Could sovereign governments permit United States armed forces to remain "above the law"—to constitute a sort of "state within a state"—for an indefinite period of time?

As I have mentioned, these governments are already under attack for special treatment given to American servicemen. Their leaders are responsible to the people just as ours are and are necessarily guided by similar political considerations. Would they be able to sign and secure ratification of a new agreement which would deprive local law enforcement authorities of all power to deal with crimes committed by Americans within their communities? I think not.

If American forces should be made completely immune to local jurisdiction, or even if this immunity should be seriously proposed, we could be sure that the Communist propagandists would

have a field day. Their phony claim that American troops are "occupation forces" would be given color, and they would have vastly increased opportunities to nourish and exploit resentments among the local population.

### **Reciprocity**

We must also remember that this treaty provides for reciprocity in the treatment of servicemen. Countries other than the United States are concerned, and it is essential that the rules which apply to one nation should apply to all. While the number of NATO military personnel stationed in this country is comparatively small, it is doubtful that our federal and state governments would wish to surrender all criminal jurisdiction over these visitors. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee in recommending consent to ratification of the NATO Status of Forces Agreement agreed that the United States should not divest itself entirely of jurisdiction over foreign servicemen in this country.

### **Question of Sovereignty**

Finally, is it reasonable that any free nation demand that its allies surrender a fundamental aspect of their sovereignty as the price of cooperation? We Americans and other Western peoples have vigorously and justifiably criticized the Soviet Union for reducing the nations of Eastern Europe to the status of satellites. We do not expect our allies to be satellites. None of these countries would accept a satellite role.

The Status of Forces Agreement goes to the very heart of American foreign policy. If American troops were not needed in Europe, the Status of Forces Agreement would not be necessary. Instead the troops would be brought home. Furthermore, if it were assumed that the NATO alliance is unimportant—that this country could get along without allies—no doubt the same conclusion would be reached. We recognize that our troops are in Europe to protect our own interests, that the alliance is vital to world peace and the survival of human freedom, and that we must work with our allies on the basis of equality and mutual respect. With that recognition the Status of Forces Agreement can be understood as a reasonable and intelligent effort to solve one of the inevitable problems of international partnership.

**August 1, 1955**

352555-55-3

## **Treaty of Mutual Understanding and Cooperation With Panama**

*Statement by Henry F. Holland*

*Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs<sup>1</sup>*

The Treaty of Mutual Understanding and Cooperation between the United States and Panama and the accompanying Memorandum of Understandings Reached, both of which were signed at Panama City on January 25, 1955,<sup>2</sup> resulted from negotiations which were begun in September 1953 at the request of Panama.

The last revision of our treaty relations with Panama relating to the construction and operation of the Panama Canal took the form of the General Treaty of March 2, 1936. While that treaty satisfied certain Panamanian aspirations which had grown up over the years since the original treaty of 1903, it failed to satisfy Panama's desire that its commerce share more fully in the benefits to be derived from the market in the Canal Zone and from ships transitting the Canal. However, local prosperity resulting from United States wartime expenditures in that region diminished the importance accorded these matters during the war and the immediate postwar period. As United States expenditures progressively tapered off in the postwar period and Panama began to encounter greater economic problems, these requests for greater commercial advantages were revived. Panama also took the position that it would be equitable to accord her a greater direct benefit from the Canal enterprise, in the form of increased annuity payments.

Shortly after taking office in 1952, President José Antonio Remón Cantera announced his intention to seek United States agreement to a review of treaty relations pertaining to the Canal. In the spring of 1953 the United States agreed to embark upon such discussions, which were begun in Washington in September 1953,<sup>3</sup> on the basis of a list of requests presented by Panama. At this same time President Remón made a State visit to Washington, at the conclusion of which Presidents Eisenhower and Remón issued a joint statement

<sup>1</sup> Made before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on July 15 (press release 431).

<sup>2</sup> For text of treaty and accompanying memorandum, together with announcement of the signing, see *BULLETIN* of Feb. 7, 1955, p. 237.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, Sept. 28, 1953, p. 418.

setting forth the principles which were to guide the subsequent negotiations.<sup>4</sup> The discussions continued in Washington until August 1954, at which time the Panamanian delegation returned to Panama to consult with their Government with regard to the positions expressed by the United States on the various Panamanian requests. President Eisenhower then informed President Remón by letter of those matters on which the United States was prepared to take affirmative action and listed certain requests on the part of the United States which, taken together, formed the basis on which the United States was willing to formulate agreements. The Panamanian President indicated that his Government was disposed to proceed to the drafting of agreements on the basis of President Eisenhower's communication, and drafting negotiations were begun in Panama in September. Final texts were agreed to in December, and the signing of the official texts took place in Panama January 25, 1955.

These negotiations, in all phases, were carried on in close consultation with the Department of Defense and the Governor of the Panama Canal Zone, as well as other agencies of the Government which were interested in certain of the matters under consideration. The agreements which are now before the Senate are supported by all the executive agencies whose respective areas of responsibility are touched upon by provisions of the agreements.

#### **Development of Panamanian Economy**

In a general way, I would say to the committee that our consideration of the Panamanian proposals was based on most careful analysis and study of each individual problem. We adopted the general principle, in considering these proposals, that it was to the interest of the United States to assist Panama to develop its economy so that Panama will be less dependent on the Canal as such as a major source of income, so long as any arrangements in this regard would not conflict with the essential interests of the United States and those of individuals resident in the Zone. It was possible to take a number of steps of this nature in the hope of building greater economic and political stability in this area so vital to us. On the other hand, Panama made a

number of requests which, if accepted, might have weakened the jurisdictional position of the United States in the Canal Zone, or might have accorded Panama a special position in economic relations with the United States or required the United States to assume financial obligations in matters for which the United States was not prepared to accept responsibility. The United States could not favorably consider these requests.

The United States, for its part, obtained certain concessions which are beneficial to the United States in the discharge of its responsibilities in the Canal Zone.

A detailed analysis of the provisions of the agreements will be found in the memorandum of the Secretary of State to the President dated May 5, 1955, which was transmitted to the Senate as an enclosure to the President's letter of May 9, 1955.<sup>5</sup> In view of the Secretary's explanation of the provisions of the agreements set forth in his memorandum, it would be repetitious for me to go into the background of each provision in this presentation. These agreements cover such a wide range of subject matter, however, that I think it might be helpful to review with you some of their more important provisions.

#### **Increased Annuity to Panama**

Article I of the treaty provides for an increase in the annuity paid to Panama for our rights in the Canal Zone from the present \$430,000 to \$1,930,000. Panama's request for an increased annuity became the key issue in the negotiations. A mutually satisfactory resolution of this issue was indispensable to the successful conclusion of the negotiations and to bringing about greater harmony in relations between the two countries. It was felt that while no legal obligation existed an increase in the annuity was justified, bearing in mind the rights, powers, and privileges granted to the United States in the Zone and their strategic and commercial value to the United States. The offer of an increased annuity was made conditional upon Panama's accepting language, inserted in the preamble and in article I, designed to safeguard the rights and jurisdictional position of the United States in the Zone. This language provides express recognition that the provisions of the 1903 Convention, the 1936 General Treaty, and the present treaty may be modified only by

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, Oct. 12, 1953, p. 487.

<sup>5</sup> S. Exec. F., 84th Cong., 1st sess.



mutual consent; and both parties recognize the absence of any obligation on the part of either party to alter the amount of the annuity.

Article II of the treaty enables the Republic of Panama to levy income taxes on Panamanian citizens employed by Canal Zone agencies, irrespective of their place of residence, and citizens of third countries so employed who reside in territory under the jurisdiction of Panama. United States citizens and members of the Armed Forces (irrespective of nationality) who are employed by Canal Zone agencies are exempt from Panamanian income tax regardless of their place of residence.

Panama has been precluded from such taxation by article X of the 1903 Convention. Our agreement to such taxation expresses a principle which is recognized in United States tax legislation that a government may impose taxes on its citizens wherever resident and on noncitizens who actually reside within its jurisdiction. Panama's request for permission to tax these categories of Canal Zone employees was agreed to since the present situation with respect to their taxation is considered inequitable and to serve no real interest of the United States. It is provided that any such tax imposed by Panama shall be on a nondiscriminatory basis.

Under article V of the treaty the United States agrees, subject to enactment of legislation by the United States Congress, to transfer to Panama certain lands, with improvements thereon, in territory under Panamanian jurisdiction and in the Canal Zone when and as determined by the United States to be no longer needed for United States Government purposes. This agreement accords with our policy of not retaining properties within Panamanian jurisdiction past the time when they are in fact required for Canal purposes. The lands and improvements to which this article refers, as well as the conditions governing the transfers, are set forth in item 2 of the Memorandum of Understandings Reached.

In article VIII of the treaty Panama agrees to reserve an area of some 19,000 acres in the Rio Hato region for the exclusive use of the United States Armed Forces for maneuvers and military training for a period of 15 years, without cost to the United States, subject to extension as may be agreed by the two Governments. Panama also has agreed in the memorandum to lease to the United States for 99 years, for a nominal con-

sideration, two parcels of land contiguous to the United States Embassy residence and to preserve permanently the area in front of the Embassy office building as a park.

In article IX Panama waives its right under article XIX of the 1903 Convention to free transportation over the Panama Railroad for persons in its service, and in article X Panama waives certain rights under the 1903 Convention in order to enable the United States in its discretion to prohibit or restrict certain specified bus and truck traffic on a possible new strategic highway across the Isthmus within the Zone, in the event of the discontinuance of the Panama Railroad and the construction of the road.

Several of the provisions in both the treaty and the memorandum were negotiated for the purpose of affording Panama greater commercial opportunities in the Canal Zone subject, where deemed necessary, to appropriate competitive safeguards. I refer in this connection to article XII of the treaty and items 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 9, and 10 of the United States undertakings in the memorandum. Subject to specified conditions and qualifications, we propose to exempt Panamanian products from the Buy American Act when purchased for use in the Zone; to withdraw from the business of selling supplies to ships in the Zone, with certain exceptions; to withdraw service and commissary privileges and free import privileges from non-United States citizen Zone employees resident in Panama; to afford the economy of Panama full opportunity to compete for purchases by Canal Zone agencies; to import merchandise for resale in the Zone from either United States or Panamanian sources insofar as feasible; and to withdraw from certain manufacturing and processing activities in the Zone. The conditions to which these items are subject are those deemed necessary for the protection of the essential interests of this Government and of the residents of the Zone.

#### **Panamanian Labor**

Item 1 of the United States undertakings in the memorandum embodies certain agreements reached with respect to the employment of Panamanian labor in the Zone. It was considered to be in the interest of the United States, not only in its relations with Panama but also in regard to its position throughout Latin America, to eliminate any appearance of discrimination in the treat-



ment of such labor. Such a policy is in accord with the exchange of notes dated March 2, 1936, ancillary to the 1936 General Treaty and with the joint statement issued October 1, 1953, by the Presidents of the United States and Panama. Accordingly we have agreed, subject to the enactment of the necessary legislation by the Congress, to the establishment of a single basic wage level for all employees in a given category regardless of citizenship, with certain increments to be added to the pay of a United States citizen employee; to uniform application of the Civil Service Retirement Act to all United States and Panamanian citizen employees of this Government in the Zone; to equality of opportunity for Panamanian citizens for employment in all United States Government positions in the Zone for which they are qualified except where security considerations require the employment of United States citizens only; and admission of Panamanian citizens to participation in job training programs.

The executive branch considers that these agreements mark a step forward in our relations with Panama and that their approval is in the national interest.

I, and other representatives of the interested executive agencies, will be happy to respond to any questions the committee may wish to ask regarding the agreements.

## Postponement of Hearings on Organization for Trade Cooperation

White House press release dated July 15

*The White House on July 15 made public the following exchange of correspondence between the President and Congressman Jere Cooper, Chairman of the Committee on Ways and Means of the House of Representatives.*

### President Eisenhower to Congressman Cooper

July 15, 1955

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: I appreciate your July fourteenth letter and readily understand your problem of arranging adequate Committee consideration of H. R. 5550 which would authorize U.S. membership in the Organization for Trade Cooperation.<sup>1</sup>

The Committee on Ways and Means has borne a heavy burden of difficult and constructive legislation in this session of Congress. Much of that constructive effort has been concerned with legislation implementing various parts of the Administration's program in the field of foreign economic policy.

More remains to be done in this field. As your letter indicates, and as we recently discussed in my office, the passage of H. R. 5550 is especially important. This legislation will do much to vouchsafe to the American people and the free world the gains which will accrue from continuation of the enlightened trade policy provided for in H. R. 1. To assure orderly consideration of trade problems arising between nations is vital to our own interests as a great trading nation and to the interests of those joined with us in the cause of freedom. This great purpose will be powerfully advanced by Congressional approval of the proposed Organization for Trade Cooperation.

I share your view that it would be ill-advised to launch consideration of H. R. 5550 in your Committee when so little time remains in this session. A matter of this vital importance should have thorough hearings, discussion and debate.

The wise course of action, therefore, it seems to me, is the one you suggest in your letter. I am pleased indeed to have your assurance that H. R. 5550 will be among the very first measures to be considered by your Committee next year.

With kind regard,

Sincerely,

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER

The Honorable JERE COOPER

Chairman

Committee on Ways and Means

House of Representatives

Washington, D. C.

### Congressman Cooper to President Eisenhower

July 14, 1955

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I am writing you in reference to your message<sup>2</sup> and our recent personal conversation relative to your request urging that the Congress enact legislation authorizing United

<sup>1</sup> For text of agreement on Organization for Trade Cooperation, see BULLETIN of Apr. 4, 1955, p. 579.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, Apr. 25, 1955, p. 678.

States membership in the Organization for Trade Cooperation. As you know, pursuant to your message I introduced H. R. 5550 on April 14, 1955, which would carry out your request.

I agree with you that enactment of this legislation is of vital importance to the continued expansion of markets for our products abroad. I am more aware of this due to the fact that I was fortunate enough to have been chosen as one of the Members of the Congress to attend the meetings in Geneva last fall, when the participating countries in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade were working out the proposals for the establishment of the Organization for Trade Cooperation.

Due to the very heavy work load of our Committee and the necessity for the enactment of legislation which you and your Administration have requested regarding laws in which time elements have been involved, as well as other legislation which our Committee has considered, it appears that there may not be time to give the full hearings and consideration to this subject which it deserves before the adjournment of Congress. In planning ahead for our Committee activities around the first of July, I had listed hearings on H. R. 5550 tentatively to begin on July 13. However, other Committee work demanded more of our Committee time than I had originally expected.

Due to the prospect of an early adjournment of the Congress and the necessity for ample notice for hearings on the Organization for Trade Cooperation legislation, it appears unlikely that proper notice and consideration could be given at this late date. Due to your so strongly urging enactment of this legislation, I would appreciate hearing from you your desire as to whether or not we should try to proceed on the Organization for Trade Cooperation legislation in the limited time which remains in this session of the Congress.

I realize full well the extreme importance of this legislation from the international point of view, and it would be my intent, if you feel that full hearings and consideration is necessary on this legislation, to schedule it for consideration very early in the next session of the Congress.

With my kindest personal regards and sincere best wishes, I am

Very respectfully yours,

JERE COOPER

## **Agreement on Participation of Belgian Forces in Korea**

Press release 433 dated July 15

Acting Secretary of State Herbert Hoover, Jr., and Baron Silvercruyts, Ambassador of Belgium, on July 15 signed an agreement providing for the settlement of Belgium's obligations for the logistical support furnished by the United States to the Belgian forces participating in the U.N. collective action in Korea. The agreement provides for reimbursement by Belgium in dollars upon presentation of statements of account by the U.S. Government.

The Belgian battalion arrived in Korea in January 1951 and was soon pressed into combat, where its gallantry contributed to the U.N. efforts in the fight against Communist aggression. The Belgian battalion together with the Luxembourg detachment received a U.S. Distinguished Unit Citation on November 1, 1951, for "outstanding performance of duty and extraordinary heroism in action against the enemy" on the Imjin River during the period April 20-26, 1951. The citation states: "The Belgian battalion and the Luxembourg detachment displayed such gallantry, determination, and esprit de corps in accomplishing their missions under extremely difficult and hazardous conditions as to set them apart and above other units participating in the action."

### **TEXT OF AGREEMENT**

#### **Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of Belgium Concerning Participation of the Belgian Forces in United Nations Operations in Korea**

This Agreement between the Government of the United States of America (the executive agent of the United Nations Forces in Korea) and the Government of Belgium shall govern relationships in matters specified herein for forces furnished by the Government of Belgium for the operations under the Commanding General of the Armed Forces of the Member States of the United Nations in Korea (hereinafter referred to as "Commander") designated by the Government of the United States of America pursuant to resolutions of United Nations Security Council of June 25, 1950, June 27, 1950, and July 7, 1950.

#### **ARTICLE 1**

The Government of the United States of America agrees to furnish the Belgian forces with available materials, supplies, services, and facilities which the Belgian forces will require for these operations, and which the Govern-

ment of Belgium is unable to furnish. The Government of the United States of America and the Government of Belgium will maintain accounts of materials, supplies, services, and facilities furnished by the Government of the United States of America to the Government of Belgium, its forces, or agencies. Reimbursement for such materials, supplies, services, and facilities will be accomplished by the Government of Belgium upon presentation of statements of account by the Government of the United States of America. Such payment will be effected by the Government of Belgium in United States dollars. Issues of materials and supplies to the Belgian forces will not operate to transfer title to the Government of Belgium in advance of reimbursement.

#### ARTICLE 2

Pursuant to Article 1, appropriate technical and administrative arrangements will be concluded between authorized representatives of the Government of the United States of America and authorized representatives of the Government of Belgium.

#### ARTICLE 3

Classified items, specialized items, or items in short supply furnished to the Government of Belgium by the Government of the United States of America will be returned to the Government of the United States of America upon request, as a credit against the cost of materials, supplies, and services previously furnished. If the Government of Belgium determines at the time of redeployment of its forces that materials or supplies received from the Government of the United States of America hereunder are not desired for retention, such materials or supplies may be offered to the Government of the United States of America and, if accepted, their residual value as determined by the Government of the United States of America will be used as a credit against reimbursement for materials, supplies, and services previously furnished.

#### ARTICLE 4

Each of the parties to this agreement agrees not to assert any claim against the other party for injury or death of members of its armed forces or for loss, damage, or destruction of its property or property of members of its armed forces caused in Korea by members of the armed forces of the other party. Claims of any other Government or its nationals against the Government or nationals of the Government of Belgium or vice versa shall be a matter for disposition between the Government of Belgium and such third government or its nationals.

#### ARTICLE 5

The Government of Belgium will maintain accounts of materials, supplies, services, and facilities furnished by other governments to personnel or agencies of the Government of Belgium, either directly or through the Commander. Settlement of any claim arising as a result of the furnishing of such materials, supplies, services, and facilities to the Government of Belgium by such third governments, whether directly or through the Commander, shall be a matter for consideration between such third governments and the Government of Belgium.

#### ARTICLE 6

The requirements of the Belgian forces for Korean currency will be supplied under arrangements approved by the Commander; provided, however, that settlement of any obligation of the Government of Belgium for use of such currency will be a matter of consideration between the Government of Belgium and the competent authorities of Korea. If, with the approval of the Commander, personnel and agencies of the Government of Belgium use media of exchange other than Korean currency in Korea, obligations arising therefrom will be a matter for consideration and settlement between the Government of Belgium and the other concerned governments.

#### ARTICLE 7

The Government of Belgium agrees that all orders, directives, and policies of the Commander issued to the Belgian forces or its personnel shall be accepted and carried out by them as given and that in the event of disagreement with such orders, directives, or policies, formal protest may be presented subsequently.

#### ARTICLE 8

Nothing in this agreement shall be construed to affect existing agreements or arrangements between the parties for the furnishing of materials, supplies, services, or facilities.

#### ARTICLE 9

This agreement shall come into force upon the date of signature thereof, and shall apply to all materials, supplies, services, and facilities furnished or rendered on, before, or after that date, to all claims referred to in Article 4 arising on, before, or after that date, and to all technical and administrative arrangements concluded pursuant to Article 2 on, before, or after that date.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned, being duly authorized by their respective governments, have signed this agreement.

DONE at Washington, in the English and French languages, the two texts having equal authenticity, this fifteenth day of July, 1955.

FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:

HERBERT HOOVER JR.

FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF BELGIUM:

SILVERCRUYS

### Korea To Get 62 Used Streetcars as Part of U.S. Aid Program

The International Cooperation Administration announced on July 1 that about 62 used American streetcars are to be purchased with U.S. aid funds and sent to Korea as part of a \$900,000 rehabilita-

tion of the street railway systems in Seoul and Pusan. The project will also include purchases of a wide variety of motors, generators, car shop equipment, parts, and other supplies needed to restore the Seoul and Pusan trolley systems.

Seoul has 30 miles of streetcar track and 135 serviceable streetcars, most of them from 30 to 40 years old. This is half the number of cars operated before the Communist invasion of 1950, but the number of passengers carried daily still averages some 600,000 and is increasing. The

street railway system is the principal means of transportation for Seoul's 2,000,000 population, and block-long queues of men, women, and children stand for long periods at trolley stops waiting to crowd onto the antiquated cars.

Similar conditions exist in Pusan, a city of a million people, where 110,000 persons daily ride over 10 miles of tracks. Only 29 of Pusan's 79 cars are operable on an average day. Seventy percent of Pusan's cars are at least 20 years old.

## U. N. Command Cites Violations of Korean Armistice Agreement

Department of Defense press release dated July 11

*Following is the verbatim text of a statement made by Maj. Gen. Harlan C. Parks, USAF, Senior Member of the United Nations Command Military Armistice Commission, at the 60th meeting of the Military Armistice Commission held July 5, 1955:*

A concept basic to the establishment and maintenance of the Armistice in Korea was that the balance which existed between the military forces of the opposing sides on July 27, 1953, would not be altered thereafter by the opposing commanders through the introduction of reinforcing military personnel or combat materiel. Provisions for implementing this basic concept were clearly spelled out in detail in paragraph 13 of the Armistice Agreement.<sup>1</sup>

Shortly after the signing of the Armistice it became apparent to the United Nations Command that the Korean People's Army and the Chinese People's Volunteers were resorting to every possible subterfuge to avoid compliance with the provisions of paragraphs 13 (c) and (d) of the Armistice Agreement. Whereas the United Nations Command submitted its first combat materiel and personnel report as prescribed in paragraphs 13 (c) and (d) of the Armistice Agreement on 28 July 1953, the day following the signing of the Armistice, it was not until 12 September 1953 that

your side submitted its first report of rotation personnel and not until 6 October 1953 that you submitted your first combat materiel report. Your first personnel report dated 12 September 1953 instead of reflecting actual arrivals and departures merely listed 964 departures and no arrivals for the 24-hour period of 15-16 September 1953. Apparently you would have the United Nations Command and Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission believe that from 28 July to 15 September, with a military force exceeding 1,200,000 men, the majority of whom came from Red China, not one soldier arrived or left Korea during that 7-week period.

Your first combat materiel report of 6 October 1953 reflected an outgoing shipment of four 57 mm. anti-tank guns with 20 rounds of ammunition, and it was not until 9 February 1954 that you submitted your first legitimate combat materiel report reflecting an incoming shipment—covering one 37 mm. AA gun. Again, you would apparently have us believe that you could logistically support your huge military force in war-torn and ravaged North Korea for the entire first 6 months of the Armistice without a single incoming shipment.

That the United Nations Command has continued scrupulously to comply with provisions of 13 (c) and (d) is reflected in the following figures taken from the official records covering the first year of the Armistice. From 27 July 1953, to 31 July 1954, the United Nations Command submitted

<sup>1</sup> For the text of the Armistice Agreement, see BULLETIN of Aug. 3, 1953, p. 132.



370 personnel reports covering 287,343 permanent arrivals and 362,122 departures. During this same period the Korean People's Army and the Chinese People's Volunteers side submitted only 42 reports covering the ridiculous figures of 12,748 permanent arrivals and 31,201 departures.

The United Nations Command during this period submitted 1,057 combat materiel reports covering the movement of 9,717 combat aircraft, 1,034 armored vehicles, 194,385 weapons, and 386,828,087 rounds of ammunition.

The Korean People's Army and the Chinese People's Volunteer side, on the other hand, submitted only 24 combat materiel reports covering the movement of zero combat aircraft, 14 armored vehicles, 1,848 weapons, and 746,500 rounds of ammunition.

The United Nations Command established a system and procedures to insure that all incoming and outgoing combat materiel and personnel were shipped only through designated ports of entry and took necessary measures to facilitate free and open inspections of these shipments by the Neutral Nations inspection teams. The Korean People's Army and the Chinese People's Volunteers, on the other hand, established no such system or procedures, failed to use your designated ports of entry, and resorted to every conceivable pretext to circumvent the provisions of 13 (c) and (d). Attempts by the Swiss and Swedish members of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission to carry out their functions of inspection and observation were effectively blocked by the Czechs and Poles.

#### **Relative Merits of Inspection Systems**

The relative merits of the inspection system established in the South as compared with that established in the North was the subject of considerable discussion and deliberation by the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission.

In the 107th plenary session of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission on 23 February 1954, General Wacker, the Senior Swiss Member, made these observations:

In the South, rotation takes place every day and every hour in all ports of entry with the exception of one, whereas in the North some spare parts are shipped out once a month through one or two ports of entry and then introduced again a few weeks after. I have never heard anything about rotation of aircraft, armored vehicles, or even complete weapons and ammunition in the North. I think we have the right to ask ourselves how it is possible

that an army counting several one hundred thousand soldiers can be logistically supported by the amount of material as shown by the figures which are being submitted to us. . . . in the South the teams control . . . all material being brought into Korea—a control which is being carried out, thanks to documents submitted by the local authorities (load manifests, ship manifests) as well as by means of inspections on the spot. I emphasize the fact that in the South these documents and inspections concern non-combat material as well as combat material. In contrast to this, we find that in the North not more than two to four inspections of spare parts of war material have been carried out every month only in the ports of entry of Sinuiju and Manpo.

General Mohn, the Senior Swedish Member of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission, observed that,

Gradually the teams in the South secured an insight in the movements of all cargo in their respective ports of entry. The Polish and Czechoslovakian members of the teams were only too eager to inspect all sorts of goods which did not even remotely have any connection with combat material. They were not in the slightest embarrassed by the restrictive interpretation of the armistice agreement apparently held by their principals in Panmunjom. . . . Well, what happened in the North? As we all know, the teams in North Korea had to wait an unusually long time before they found anything to put their teeth in. They wandered about aimlessly in their ports of entry, not knowing exactly what to do.

The airfield situation that existed in the territory under your control at the time the Armistice Agreement was signed is well known by your side as well as ours. All airfields under the control of the Korean People's Army and the Chinese People's Volunteers had been under continuous attack and were inoperative. Photographs taken by the United Nations Command on 27 July 1953 prove that on that date the Korean People's Army and the Chinese People's Volunteers had no Air Force and not one usable airfield. Our side has presented these official photographs to the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission and the evidence disclosed by them has never been challenged or refuted.

Within a few months after the Armistice Agreement was signed our radar surveillance detected continuously increasing jet aircraft activity in the territory occupied by the Korean People's Army and the Chinese People's Volunteers side. Such radar detection was irrefutable proof of your violation of paragraph 13 (d).

On 21 September 1953 this evidence was further confirmed when Senior Lieutenant Ro Kum Suk, a Korean People's Army and the Chinese



People's Volunteers pilot officer who deserted from the Korean People's Army and the Chinese People's Volunteers side, landed at a Republic of Korea airport and surrendered a MIG-15 combat aircraft which had been illegally introduced into Korean People's Army and the Chinese People's Volunteers territory in defiance of paragraph 13 (d) of the Armistice Agreement. This pilot offered irrefutable proof that from 27 July 1953 until 21 September 1953 he was engaged in the air movement of MIG-15 aircraft. These combat planes were introduced into the territory under the military control of your side subsequent to the signing of the Armistice Agreement and in direct and willful violation thereof. This pilot had personally observed at least 80 combat aircraft that were brought into the territory of your side contrary to paragraph 13 (d).

#### Series of Official Protests

Faced by this serious development and possessed with irrefutable evidence, the United Nations Command, on 12 October 1953, lodged its first official protest against the Korean People's Army and the Chinese People's Volunteers for violating the provisions of paragraph 13 (d) of the Armistice Agreement by the illegal introduction of aircraft into the territory under your control. The United Nations Command requested the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission to conduct an investigation on an airfield near Uiju, where such aircraft were definitely known to be located. Despite the attempts of your Czech and Pole members on the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission to forestall this investigation, the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission finally agreed to dispatch a mobile inspection team, but due to collusion between the Czech and Pole members of the mobile inspection team with the Korean People's Army and the Chinese People's Volunteers military representatives at the scene of the investigation, you were successful in thwarting any realistic investigation. Documents requested by the Swiss and Swede members of the team were refused on grounds that they were secret, requests by Swiss and Swede members to conduct inspections at the railroad station and other shipping points around the Uiju airfield were denied, and visual observations of the Uiju airfield were carefully restricted and controlled to insure that the team would observe no incriminating evidence.

Based upon new and additional evidence of your continued secret Air Force build-up, on 9 February 1954, the United Nations Command lodged its second official protest against your illegal introduction of combat aircraft. A letter was dispatched to the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission outlining our charges and requesting that mobile inspection teams be dispatched to conduct special observations, inspections, and investigations at the following airfields: Pyongyang, Taechon, Pyongyang East, Uiju, Pyongyang Main, Sinuiju Northeast, Wonsan, Saamcham, and Sunan, as well as road and rail by-passes in the vicinity of the ports of entry of Sinuiju, Chongjin and Manpo.

Although the Swiss and Swedish members of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission were in favor of dispatching the requested mobile inspection teams, the action was blocked by the veto power of your Polish and Czech comrades, and the investigation was thereby prevented. Previously, General Bures, Czechoslovak, on 29 January 1954, had summed up the attitudes always taken by the Czech and Polish members in regard to United Nations Command requests for investigations when he said, "All accusations against the Korean People's Army and the Chinese People's Volunteers side are nothing but groundless fabrications. . . ." Later, 10 February 1954, Colonel Bibrowski, Polish member, in speaking of a United Nations Command request for a mobile inspection team, states, "The Polish delegation cannot agree to consider such a request and in no case is it ready to comply with it."

From the actions of your side and the actions of your unneutral Czech and Pole representation in the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission on this and the previous United Nations Command protest it became obvious that any realistic neutral inspection of your illegal activities was virtually impossible. Although the United Nations Command was cognizant throughout the following year of your continued illegal Air Force build-up, it was not until you overtly employed your illegally amassed air power on 5 February 1955 by making an unprovoked attack against United Nations Command aircraft on a routine training mission over international waters that the United Nations Command lodged another protest against your side.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, Mar. 14, 1955, p. 426.

In the Military Armistice Commission negotiations on this incident you inadvertently admitted that your own MIG aircraft participated in this air battle. This admission constituted conclusive corroboration of your illegal introduction of combat aircraft, of not making the proper combat materiel reports and of by-passing the designated ports of entry, all in violation of the Armistice Agreement.

The third official protest against your illegal introduction of combat materiel was therefore made by the United Nations Command on 21 February 1955. Again the complaint was spelled out in detail.

The United Nations Command charges that the Korean People's Army and the Chinese People's Volunteers have between the dates of 27 July 1953 and 5 February 1955 introduced into the territory under the military control of their side combat aircraft of the MIG type, arms, and ammunition therefor, in excess of combat aircraft of the MIG type, arms, and ammunition therefor in the territory under the military control of the Korean People's Army and the Chinese People's Volunteers side on 27 July 1953, and have failed to report them in the prescribed manner and form to the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission, in violation of paragraph 13 (d) and other provisions of the Armistice Agreement.

Again the United Nations Command requested a mobile inspection team investigation of six airfields where your illegally introduced MIG aircraft were known to be based. Again your Czech and Pole cohorts on the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission ably represented your side and successfully stalled the dispatch of the mobile inspection teams for one week, enabling you to fly your MIG's away from the bases to be investigated and otherwise remove or hide incriminating evidence. That most of your MIG's were flown out was irrefutably established by our radar surveillance. When the mobile inspection teams reached your airfields, every effort of the Swiss and Swede members to make full and impartial investigations was thwarted by the Czech and Polish members, just as they had thwarted the investigation of Uiju in October 1953. Although the official reports submitted by these teams reveal that at least 88 MIG's were observed on those fields, the Czechs and Poles vetoed requests by the Swiss and Swedes for available documents which could have established the dates when those aircraft were brought into the territory under your control. It is significant to note that these documents were the same type documents that were freely offered by

the United Nations Command side to mobile inspection teams operating in the South.

On 10 May 1955 again your illegally introduced aircraft made an unprovoked attack against United Nations Command aircraft on a routine training mission over international waters. On 13 May 1955 the United Nations Command lodged a strong letter of protest against the Korean People's Army and the Chinese People's Volunteers for this hostile act and for the fourth time charged your side with illegally introducing combat aircraft in violation of the Armistice Agreement.<sup>3</sup>

An analysis of the official reports submitted by the United Nations Command and the Korean People's Army and the Chinese People's Volunteers covering combat materiel shipments for the period 28 July 1953 to 31 May 1955, reflects the following:

The United Nations Command has submitted 1,969 combat materiel reports, covering movement of 16,141 combat aircraft, 2,492 armored vehicles, 447,803 weapons, and 608,386,231 rounds of ammunition.

The Korean People's Army and the Chinese People's Volunteers has submitted 162 combat materiel reports, covering the movement of zero combat aircraft, 245 armored vehicles, 144,808 weapons, and 50,674,619 rounds of ammunition. I repeat, in the first 22 months of the Armistice, despite the fact that you have twice openly employed your illegally acquired combat aircraft in large numbers in hostile and unwarranted attacks against the United Nations Command, your side has not yet submitted the report covering the movement of combat aircraft in or out of Korea.

#### **Evidence Provided by Defectors**

At approximately 1315 hours 21 June 1955, Senior Lieutenant Lee Un Yong, pilot, and Junior Lieutenant Lee In Son, navigator, both members of the Korean People's Armed Forces Air Force, after defecting from your side and leaving Pyongyang Main airfield, landed at Seoul airbase and surrendered a YAK-18 aircraft to our side. These men have also surrendered themselves and have asked for asylum from the tyranny and abuse they suffered under your control. This has been granted. Moreover, they have offered to

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, May 30, 1955, p. 891.

make their full contribution toward the defeat of your iniquitous conspiracy.

Your side will recognize their names. They are men who have held positions of high trust and responsibility in your forces. Senior Lieutenant Lee, the pilot, had served 8 years and 6 months in your armed forces. He graduated from the Air Academy in Chkalov, U. S. S. R., and the Air Officers' School in Yenching, Manchuria. Your side has rewarded him with the 3d Class Order of the National Flag Medal, 2d Class Order of the National Flag Medal, 2d Class Freedom and Independence Medal, Air Merit Medal. Senior Lieutenant Lee was a member of the Korean People's Armed Forces Air Force, 858th Independent Night-Bomber Regiment.

Junior Lieutenant Lee In Son has served in your forces for 4 years and 9 months. His services have been rewarded by the presentation of the Merit Medal. He was a member of the Korean People's Armed Forces Air Force, 858th Independent Night-Bomber Regiment.

Senior Lieutenant Lee, the pilot of the YAK-18 aircraft, was stationed at Pyongyang Main airfield from July 1953 until September 1954 and again from February 1955 until 21 June 1955, the date of his defection. The navigator was at Pyongyang Main from July of 1953 until his defection with Senior Lieutenant Lee on 21 June 1955. Both men had made frequent and regular flights to other principal bases used by your air forces. Consequently both men were well informed on the airfield development in North Korea, and the strength, composition, deployment, and operations of your illegally established Air Force.

I now present you with the evidence provided freely and voluntarily to our side by these two former members of your Air Force:

1. The YAK-18 aircraft which Senior Lieutenant Lee and Junior Lieutenant Lee flew from Pyongyang Main to Seoul on 21 June 1955 bears serial number 8715. The YAK-18 is fitted with one under-wing bomb rack under each wing, and each rack is capable of carrying a 100 kilogram bomb. Senior Lieutenant Lee stated that while stationed at Antung, Manchuria, he flew aircraft of this type in night bombing combat operations from October 1951, to March 1952, and that he has flown 600 hours in this type of aircraft, of which 200 hours were in combat. The YAK-18

in which the defectors came to Seoul is a combat aircraft as defined by the Military Armistice Commission; it was brought to Korea in April, 1954, in direct violation of paragraph 13 (d).

2. Although we know, and our photographs taken on 27 July 1953 prove that at the time of the Armistice Agreement there were no airfields in the territory under your command capable of supporting combat aircraft, these defectors have stated that Uiju, Sunan, Sunchon, Pyongyang East (Mirin-Ni) and Onkong-Ni, have been restored to full operation and are supporting combat aircraft. Our radar tracks have verified the flying activity at these fields. The defectors also stated that more fields are being built to support the growing strength of the Korean People's Armed Forces Air Force. This is further evidence of your expanding Air Force strength.

3. The two defectors were stationed at Pyongyang in March, 1955 during the period mobile inspection teams 6, 7, and 8 were conducting their investigations. Senior Lieutenant Lee and Junior Lieutenant Lee provided specific information on steps your side took to remove, disguise and conceal incriminating evidence during the mobile inspection team investigations. Among the ruses employed by your side were the following:

- A. Your side flew many combat aircraft away from the inspected airfields.

- B. Your side hid combat aircraft in ravines in the hills in the vicinity of the airfields and camouflaged them.

- C. Your side dismantled some of the aircraft and concealed them.

- D. Your side stationed heavy guards about the hiding places and prevented inspection of these areas by the mobile inspection teams.

- E. Your side arbitrarily reduced the boundaries of the airfields, thereby restricting the scope of the mobile inspection team inspection.

- F. Your side prepared false testimony by long, detailed coaching of probable witnesses and by substituting politically indoctrinated higher ranking officers for lower ranking officers by switching insignias.

- G. Your side delayed the assembly of newly arrived combat aircraft at Taechon by leaving them in their crates until the mobile inspection team investigations were completed. Senior Lieutenant Lee, who reads Russian, noticed the word-

ing "Kiev Aircraft Factory" on tags attached to one of his unit's combat aircraft. This aircraft's log book showed that the plane left the Russian factory in March 1955.

4. The defectors have also stated that since the signing of the Armistice Agreement the illegal build-up of the Korean People's Armed Forces Air Force has been taking place, so that at the present time there are more than 300 combat aircraft, the majority of which are jet fighters of the MIG-15 type. This has also been confirmed by our radar and by the incidents where our aircraft have been attacked over international waters by Korean People's Armed Forces Air Force fighters.

5. The two defectors confirmed the fact that the MIG-15 jet fighters, which attacked United Nations planes over international waters on the 5th of February, 1955, and on the 10th of May, 1955, flew from bases in the territory under the military control of your side, and that these MIG aircraft belonged to your air forces.

#### **List of Charges**

The information provided our side by your two most recent defectors merely served to confirm existing evidence and provide another link in the long chain the United Nations Command has constructed to irrefutably prove your illegal Air Force build-up.

I have presented to you today the official record of your continuous and numerous violations of paragraph 13 (d), paragraph 17, and other fundamental provisions of the Armistice Agreement, throughout the Armistice period. It stands as monumental evidence to the United Nations Command and the free world of your complete insincerity, dishonesty, and utter lack of integrity. The combat forces, and particularly the air forces, that you have built up illegally and covertly since the signing of the Armistice, constitute a grave situation which threatens seriously the very structure and stability of the Armistice itself.

The United Nations Command, at this time, lodges the strongest and most serious protest made against your side since the signing of the Armistice and charges that, through your willful, deliberate and illegal build-up of your combat forces, you have:

1. Flagrantly violated every basic provision of the Armistice Agreement, including the spirit and intent of that document.

2. Clearly demonstrated your aggressive intent of acquiring a favorable military position over the forces of the United Nations Command.

The United Nations Command demands that:

1. You provide the United Nations Command, without delay, an accurate accounting of all combat materiel and combat aircraft introduced into the territory of your side since the signing of the Armistice.

2. You immediately provide the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission with corrected combat materiel reports which reflect the mass of combat materiel and hundreds of aircraft you have illegally introduced into Korea.

3. You cease immediately the illegal introduction of additional combat materiel and combat aircraft into the territory of your side.

We have listened since last summer to the soothing music of your peaceful propaganda and your expressions for a free and independent united Korea, while at the same time contending with your continued willful and flagrant violations of the Armistice Agreement, your hostile and aggressive actions, and your murderous and inhumane atrocities. The time has come to demand that the powers who are directing your iniquitous activities start trying to reconcile your Dr. Jekyll with your Mr. Hyde.

#### **Guatemala To Receive More Corn To Help Meet Drought Shortage**

The International Cooperation Administration announced on July 7 that it is granting an additional 12,300 tons of corn to Guatemala, bringing to approximately 30,000 tons the total authorized to help that country meet a critical shortage.

The corn, the first of which was authorized in April, is being given to the Government of Guatemala, which will sell it through normal channels. Local currency proceeds from this sale will be used for economic development projects which will complement ICA's regular technical cooperation programs in Guatemala.

The corn is being granted to Guatemala under Title II, Public Law 480, through which surplus agricultural commodity stocks of the Commodity Credit Corporation are made available to friendly peoples faced with famine or other disaster requiring relief.



## Second Progress Report on the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act

### MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT TO THE CONGRESS<sup>1</sup>

#### *To the Congress of the United States:*

I transmit herewith the second semiannual report of the President on the activities carried on under Public Law 480, 83d Congress, as required by that law.

This report contains the details of the programs carried out under the act through June 30, 1955, including the volume and dollar value of commodities agreed on as well as of those already shipped, together with the planned uses of the foreign currencies generated by sales.

With experience under the act now running to some 10 months, a study is being initiated to analyze the whole problem of disposal of our agricultural surpluses. It will be the intent of this study to try to appraise objectively what the potentialities are for disposals of such surpluses within the framework of the legislative and executive policies that are applicable to legislation such as Public Law 480.

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER

THE WHITE HOUSE, July 12, 1955

#### Introduction

The first progress report on the disposal of United States surplus agricultural commodities under the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954 (Public Law 480, 83d Cong., 2d sess.) covered the first 6 months of fiscal year 1955.<sup>2</sup> This report deals with further developments under the several Public Law 480 programs during the last 6 months of fiscal year 1955.

As of June 30, 1955, a total of \$1,200 million of commodities had been sold, distributed or committed under the three titles of the act. Agree-

ments for the sale of surplus agricultural commodities for foreign currencies under title I totaled \$468.8 million at Ccc [Commodity Credit Corporation] cost. Shipments made or authorized under title II of the act totaled \$109 million at Ccc cost. Contracts negotiated for the exchange of agricultural commodities for strategic or other materials under title III totaled \$281 million at export market value except for wheat exchanges registered under the International Wheat Agreement. Donations for domestic relief purposes and foreign relief purposes under this title amounted to \$341.7 million at Ccc cost. Although the figures cited for the different programs are not strictly comparable, the total of \$1,200 million does give an indication of the volume of commodities moving or committed under these programs.

#### Interagency Relationships

Several agencies of the Government were assigned responsibilities under the act by Executive Order 10560 issued September 9, 1954.<sup>3</sup> Primary responsibility for sales under title I and for programs under title III rests with the Secretary of Agriculture. Responsibility for programs under title II of the act was vested in the Director of the Foreign Operations Administration.

To assist the various agencies in carrying out their respective responsibilities, the Interagency Committee on Agricultural Surplus Disposal was established. This Committee, which is chaired by Mr. Clarence Francis, special consultant to the President, has been concerned primarily with the resolution of policy issues that developed in the course of program operations under Public Law 480. Responsibility for coordinating operations has been vested in the Interagency Staff Commit-

<sup>1</sup> H. Doc. 216, 84th Cong., 1st sess.; transmitted on July 12.

<sup>2</sup> BULLETIN of Jan. 31, 1955, p. 200.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, Oct. 4, 1954, p. 501.

tee on Agricultural Surplus Disposal, established under the chairmanship of a representative of the Secretary of Agriculture. This Committee has held 65 meetings during the last fiscal year. The effectiveness of the cooperative efforts in these two Committees is illustrated by program results to this time.

## TITLE I OF PUBLIC LAW 480

### Agreements Signed

Title I requires that formal agreements be entered into between the United States Government and the friendly foreign government concerned before commodities may be sold for foreign currencies. When the first progress report was made to Congress on January 10, 1955, agreements had been signed with two countries—Turkey<sup>4</sup> and Yugoslavia.<sup>5</sup> A preliminary understanding had been reached with representatives of the Government of Japan for a large program, and active negotiations were underway with a number of additional countries.

As of June 30, 1955, a total of 21 agreements had been signed with 17 foreign governments. The total value of these agreements at Ccc cost is approximately \$468.8 million.

A number of negotiations initiated last year have carried over into the current year involving an additional total of approximately \$100 million at Ccc cost. Agreements with some of these countries may be concluded shortly. In addition, a survey is being completed of other sales possibilities. Some of these involve potential agreements with countries with which agreements were concluded during the first year.

As of June 30, 1955, somewhat less than one-third of the value of the commodities included in signed agreements had been exported. Most of the remaining commodities authorized under signed agreements are expected to be exported during the first quarter of the current fiscal year.

### Commodity Composition

The commodity composition of agreements concluded through June 30, 1955, is as follows:

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, Nov. 29, 1954, p. 814.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, Jan. 24, 1955, p. 138.

Commodity	Quantity	Market value CCC cost (million dollars)	
Wheat . . . . .	52.6 mil. bu . . .	93.0	167.9
Feed grains . . . .	22.5 mil. bu. . . .	27.75	40.7
Rice . . . . .	2.2 mil. cwt. . . .	14.7	21.4
Cotton . . . . .	647.2 thous. bales.	124.15	124.2
Tobacco . . . . .	61.8 mil. lbs. . . .	40.1	40.1
Dairy products . . .	52.2 mil. lbs. . . .	6.6	10.4
Vegetable oils . . .	149.4 mil. lbs. . . .	22.2	31.8
Total commodities.	. . . . .	328.5	436.5
Ocean transportation.	. . . . .	32.3	32.3
Total, including ocean transportation.	. . . . .	360.8	468.8

It should be noted that approximately two-thirds of the value of programs authorized during the last year provided for the financing of export sales of two of our most burdensome surplus commodities—wheat and cotton. These amounts equal about 25 percent of U.S. exports of wheat and about 17 percent of U.S. exports of cotton during 1954-55.

### Relationship to Usual Marketings

Public Law 480 provides that sales of agricultural commodities for foreign currencies should be in addition to our usual marketings and should not be unduly disruptive of world market prices. In order to provide reasonable safeguards against displacement of usual United States marketings, appropriate assurances have been obtained from foreign governments. In addition, sales for foreign currency under title I have been made at the same price level at which these commodities were available for export sales for dollars.

As used in this report Ccc cost represents the cost of commodities to Ccc, including investment, processing, and handling charges. Export market value reflects the price at which these commodities are sold to foreign buyers under the program. The export market value figures are less than the Ccc cost for those commodities for which special export programs have been developed for dollar as well as foreign currency sales to meet competition in international trade.

### Ocean Transportation

The total dollar cost of financing ocean transportation under agreements entered into with foreign countries under title I is estimated at \$32.3

million. Reimbursement is required in foreign currencies for the ocean freight financed by the United States except for any amount by which the cost of shipment on United States vessels required under the law exceeds prevailing freight rates on foreign-flag vessels.

### Currency Uses

The use of foreign currencies acquired through sales under title I are set forth in the sales agreements entered into with foreign governments. In the agreements signed with 17 countries, totaling approximately \$360.8 million at export market value, 27.6 percent of the proceeds are scheduled to be used in payment of United States obligations in these countries. About 42.6 percent will be loaned to foreign governments to promote multilateral trade and economic development, and 20.4 percent will be used to procure items for the common defense of the United States and allied na-

tions. For the agreements concluded as of June 30, the dollar values of planned foreign currency uses under the eight categories authorized in section 104 of title I of the act are as follows:

	Million dollars	Percent
Market development (sec. 104 (a)).	8.2	2.3
Purchase of strategic material (sec. 104 (b)).	2.8	0.8
Military procurement (sec. 104 (c)).	73.5	20.4
Purchase of goods for other countries (sec. 104 (d)).	13.2	3.6
Grants for multilateral trade and economic development (sec. 104 (e)).	7.5	2.1
Payment of U.S. obligations (sec. 104 (f)).	99.5	27.6
Loans for multilateral trade and economic development (sec. 104 (g)).	153.17	42.6
International educational exchange (sec. 104 (h)).	2.94	0.8
Total signed agreements----	360.82	100.0

TABLE I

PLANNED USES OF FOREIGN CURRENCY UNDER PUBLIC LAW 480 AS OF JUNE 30, 1955

Country	Total amt. programed (Mkt. value incl. O. T.)	Market development <sup>1</sup>	Purchase of strategic material	Military procurement	Purchase of goods for other countries	Grants for multi. trade and economic development	Payment of U.S. obligations <sup>1</sup>	Loans for multi. trade and economic development	Int. ed. exchange <sup>1</sup>
		(104 a)	(104 b)	(104 c)	(104 d)	(104 e)	(104 f)	(104 g)	(104 h)
Signed agreements	Million dollars								
Argentina.	5.8	0.2					3.0	2.3	0.3
Austria.	6.1	0.2	0.8				3.4	1.5	0.2
Chile.	5.0	0.2					0.5	4.0	0.3
Colombia.	5.3	0.2					1.9	3.0	0.2
Finland.	5.3	0.2					4.8		0.3
Greece.	14.3					7.5	2.6	4.2	
Israel.	13.0	0.3			3.1		1.8	7.4	0.4
Italy.	50.0	1.7	1.0		4.6		12.7	30.0	
Japan.	85.0	2.0			5.5		17.25	59.5	0.75
Korea.	15.0			6.0			9.0		
Pakistan.	29.4	2.0		14.5			2.9	10.0	
Peru.	7.5						2.0	5.5	
Spain.	21.0	1.0	1.0				8.0	10.5	0.5
Thailand.	2.0	0.2					1.0	0.8	
Turkey.	28.9						14.47	14.47	
United Kingdom.	15.2			15.2					
Yugoslavia.	52.0			37.8			14.2		
Total signed agreements.	360.8	8.2	2.8	73.5	13.2	7.5	99.5	153.17	2.95
Uses as percent of total	100.0	2.3	0.8	20.4	3.6	2.1	27.6	42.6	0.8

<sup>1</sup> Some agreements lump authorized currency uses, especially under section 104 (a), (f), and (h). Where estimates of distribution among the authorized uses are available, the estimate is shown under the specific section. Otherwise 104 (f) may include sums which may be distributed over a number of U.S. uses. The amount shown for Yugoslavia covers unspecified U.S. uses.

<sup>2</sup> In return for this currency use, the U.K. Air Ministry will construct and make available to U.S. Armed Forces an equivalent value of dependent housing in the United Kingdom.

Details of the schedule of planned currency uses are shown in table I. Loans for the promotion of multilateral trade and economic development authorized under section 104 (g) are the largest single planned use of foreign currencies under agreements signed through June 30. These loans are being made on the basis of standard terms. These terms provide for (1) denominating the loans in United States dollars, (2) an interest rate of 3 percent if repayment is made in dollars and a rate of 4 percent if repayment is made in foreign currency, (3) repayment of the principal within a period not in excess of 40 years. Actual repayment periods have varied between 9 and 40 years. In a few cases provision has been made for accepting strategic materials in repayment of the loan.

#### Detail of Country Agreements

On the following page is a tabulation showing for each country with which agreements have been concluded, the date of signing, the CCC cost and the export market value of commodities included, the value of ocean transportation financed by CCC, and the total cost of the program.

### TITLE II COMMITMENTS

Title II programs already authorized or under active consideration at the end of June 1955 approximate \$150 million.

Shipments already authorized total \$109 million including \$81 million in grain, \$15 million in fats, \$5 million each of cotton and milk products, and \$3 million dry beans. This compares with the total authorized by the end of December of \$68 million. The programs include assistance to 15 countries, as well as a Christmas holiday program in 45 countries. The \$109 million of shipments made or under way is composed as follows:

	CCC cost and investment (In millions of dollars)
Yugoslavia . . . . .	44.5
Bolivia . . . . .	15.2
Christmas food packages (45 countries) . . . . .	16.7
Pakistan . . . . .	10.0
Libya . . . . .	4.2
Haiti . . . . .	3.2
Nepal . . . . .	0.2
Italy . . . . .	1.2
Viet-Nam . . . . .	0.8
Guatemala . . . . .	3.0
Honduras . . . . .	0.2

	CCC cost and investment (In millions of dollars)
Danube flood . . . . .	10.2
Austria . . . . .	1.9
Czechoslovakia . . . . .	1.7
Germany (Fed. Rep.) . . . . .	1.0
Germany (Sov. Occ.) . . . . .	0.7
Hungary . . . . .	2.7
Yugoslavia . . . . .	2.2
Total . . . . .	109.4

### TITLE III

#### Sec. 302—Domestic Donations

During the current fiscal year, this authority has been used for donations to school-lunch programs, charitable institutions, and programs for relief of needy persons. In May 1955, 11 million children were being fed through the school lunch program, 1.2 million persons in charitable institutions, and 2.5 million in programs for relief of needy persons. The following table shows the estimated quantities distributed under this authority.

ESTIMATED QUANTITIES OF SURPLUS FOODS DONATED TO DOMESTIC RECIPIENTS UNDER PUBLIC LAW 480 FISCAL YEAR 1955

Commodity	School lunches	Charitable institutions	Needy persons	Total millions of pounds	Total in millions of dollars at CCC cost
		(Millions of pounds)			
Butter. . . . .	41.0	22.8	28.2	92.0	\$64.6
Cheese . . . . .	24.5	13.8	36.8	75.1	37.0
Nonfat dry milk . .	18.0	12.8	41.4	72.2	16.6

#### Section 302—Foreign Donations

In the first semiannual report on foreign operations under section 302 it was indicated that greater use would be made of agricultural commodities for charitable purposes abroad this year than last year. Donations of commodities for distribution to needy persons abroad this year are estimated at 568.7 million pounds. This is an increase of approximately 200 percent in volume as compared with the 183.9 million pounds which were donated for this purpose in fiscal year 1954.

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Country	Date signed	Commodity composition	Market value	CCC cost
			(Thousands of dollars)	
Argentina . . . . .	4/25/55	Cottonseed oil . . . . .	5,670	8,591
		Ocean transportation . . . . .	130	130
		Total Argentine program . . . . .	5,800	8,721
Austria . . . . .	6/14/55	Feedgrains . . . . .	4,500	6,672
		Cotton . . . . .	500	500
		Tobacco . . . . .	500	500
		Ocean transportation . . . . .	584	584
		Total Austrian program . . . . .	6,084	8,256
Chile . . . . .	1/27/55	Wheat . . . . .	2,200	3,943
		Cottonseed oil . . . . .	2,400	3,336
		Ocean transportation . . . . .	396	396
		Total Chilean program . . . . .	4,996	7,675
Colombia . . . . .	6/24/55	Wheat . . . . .	1,600	2,700
		Cotton . . . . .	1,600	1,600
		Cottonseed oil . . . . .	1,000	1,400
		Dairy products . . . . .	700	1,200
		Ocean transportation . . . . .	400	400
		Total Colombian program . . . . .	5,300	7,300
Finland . . . . .	5/5/55	Cotton . . . . .	2,900	2,900
		Tobacco . . . . .	2,214	2,214
		Ocean transportation . . . . .	136	136
		Total Finnish program . . . . .	5,250	5,250
Greece . . . . .	6/24/55	Dairy products . . . . .	2,694.5	3,727
		Feedgrains . . . . .	2,737	3,905
		Cottonseed oil . . . . .	2,293.5	3,115
		Wheat . . . . .	5,075	9,437
		Ocean transportation . . . . .	1,500	1,500
		Total Greece program . . . . .	*14,300	21,684
Israel . . . . .	4/29/55	Wheat . . . . .	4,800	8,802
		Rice . . . . .	300	300
		Cotton . . . . .	1,100	1,100
		Tobacco . . . . .	200	200
		Butter . . . . .	962	1,661
		Feedgrains . . . . .	3,300	5,309
		Cottonseed oil . . . . .	700	1,032
		Ocean transportation . . . . .	1,638	1,638
		Total Israeli program . . . . .	13,000	20,042
Italy . . . . .	5/23/55	Cotton . . . . .	35,900	35,900
		Wheat . . . . .	9,100	16,922
		Tobacco . . . . .	3,200	3,200
		Ocean transportation . . . . .	1,828	1,828
		Total Italian program . . . . .	50,028	57,850
Japan . . . . .	5/31/55	Wheat . . . . .	22,448	40,332
		Barley . . . . .	3,126	4,786
		Rice . . . . .	14,352	21,074
		Cotton . . . . .	34,100	34,100
		Tobacco . . . . .	5,000	5,000
		Ocean transportation . . . . .	5,974	5,974
		Total Japanese program . . . . .	85,000	111,266

\*This figure is composed of two separate agreements signed on the same date. The first agreement, totaling \$6,000,000, is a regular title I program. The purpose of the second agreement, totaling \$8,300,000, is to help Greece meet disaster conditions resulting from the earthquake of May 1955.

Country	Date signed	Commodity composition	Market value	CCC cost
			(Thousands of dollars)	
Korea . . . . .	5/31/55	Cotton . . . . .	9,400	9,400
		Tobacco . . . . .	4,615	4,615
		Ocean transportation . . . . .	985	985
		Total Korean program . . . . .	15,000	15,000
Pakistan . . . . .	5/9/55	Cotton . . . . .	21,352	21,352
		Tobacco . . . . .	3,000	3,000
		Ghee . . . . .	2,000	3,460
		Linseed oil . . . . .	972	1,675
		Ocean transportation . . . . .	2,076	2,076
		Total Pakistani program . . . . .	29,400	31,563
Peru . . . . .	2/10/55	Wheat . . . . .	6,420	11,413
		Butter . . . . .	230	374
		Ocean transportation . . . . .	855	855
		Total Peruvian program . . . . .	7,505	12,642
Spain . . . . .	4/21/55	Cotton . . . . .	7,750	7,750
		Cottonseed oil . . . . .	5,000	6,929
		Tobacco . . . . .	4,500	4,500
		Corn . . . . .	1,750	2,530
		Ocean transportation . . . . .	2,000	2,000
		Total Spanish program . . . . .	21,000	23,709
Thailand . . . . .	6/21/55	Tobacco . . . . .	1,900	1,900
		Ocean transportation . . . . .	100	100
		Total Thai program . . . . .	2,000	2,000
Turkey . . . . .	11/15/54	Wheat . . . . .	6,491	12,023
		Feedgrains . . . . .	12,426	17,546
		Cottonseed oil . . . . .	4,144	5,694
		Ocean transportation . . . . .	5,887	5,887
		Total Turkish program . . . . .	28,948	41,150
United Kingdom . . . . .	6/14/55	Tobacco . . . . .	15,000	15,000
		Ocean transportation . . . . .	220	220
		Total U. K. program . . . . .	15,220	15,220
Yugoslavia . . . . .	1/5/55	Wheat . . . . .	34,932	62,279
		Cotton . . . . .	9,600	9,684
		Ocean transportation . . . . .	7,517	7,517
		Total Yugoslav program . . . . .	52,049	79,480

(Continued from page 200)

The Department of Agriculture has approved orders from 18 United States private welfare agencies and the United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund for distribution in 57 foreign countries of the following commodities: Non-fat dry milk, butter, cheese, cottonseed oil, shorten-

ing, and butter oil. Because of depleted government holdings, cottonseed oil and shortening were withdrawn from the list of commodities available for donation under this program at the end of fiscal year 1955. The table below shows the quantities and value of commodities approved for foreign donations for fiscal year 1955.

**QUANTITIES OF COMMODITIES AND ESTIMATED EXPORT MARKET VALUE APPROVED FOR DONATIONS TO INTERGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS AND U.S. VOLUNTARY AGENCIES FOR DISTRIBUTION TO THE FOREIGN NEEDY**

*Under section 302 of the (section 416 as amended)  
Agricultural Act of 1949*

Fiscal year 1955

Commodity	Millions of pounds	Millions of dollars at CCC cost
Nonfat dry milk . . . . .	285. 2	65. 6
Butter. . . . .	81. 3	57. 1
Cheese . . . . .	91. 4	45. 0
Cottonseed oil . . . . .	29. 3	7. 1
Shortening. . . . .	34. 6	8. 4
Butter oil . . . . .	46. 9	40. 3
Total . . . . .	568. 7	\$223. 5

**TITLE III BARTER**

Under section 303 of title III, Public Law 480, the Commodity Credit Corporation is authorized to barter its agricultural commodities for strategic materials and certain other materials, goods, and equipment. All such operations are conducted through private United States trade channels.

During the last 6 months contracts negotiated by the Commodity Credit Corporation provide for the disposition abroad of agricultural commodities valued at \$186 million. This is a sizable gain in activity as compared with the \$95 million worth of barter contracts entered into during the first 6 months of fiscal year 1955. The total barter activity of \$281 million for fiscal year 1955 compares with barter dispositions of somewhat less than \$30 million during fiscal year 1954 and a grand total of less than \$95 million for the fiscal years 1950-54.

The value of agricultural commodities under barter contracts which were shipped from the United States during fiscal year 1955 was about \$120 million. The major commodity included in the export total is approximately 45 million bushels of wheat, which represents about 85 percent of the total value of commodities moved. Other commodities which have moved under the barter program include corn, flaxseed, grain sorghums, barley oats, cottonseed oil, cotton, and rye.

About 90 percent of the value of barter contracts negotiated during fiscal year 1955 involve

the exchange of agricultural surpluses for strategic materials. It is expected that the bulk of these materials will be transferred to the stockpile as stockpile funds become available to reimburse the Corporation.

Commodities exported under the program have moved to a large number of countries including Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, Yugoslavia, United Kingdom, Ireland, Cyprus, Egypt, Israel, India, Formosa, Japan, Korea, Colombia, and Peru.

**PUBLICATIONS**

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**Technical Cooperation, Program of Water Utilization in Area between Maule and Bio-Bio Rivers.** TIAS 2943. Pub. 5480. 19 pp. 15¢.

Agreement between the United States and Chile—Signed at Santiago June 27, 1953. Entered into force June 27, 1953.

**Technical Cooperation.** TIAS 2944. Pub. 5481. 5 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Bolivia. Exchange of notes—Signed at La Paz August 27, 1953 and January 15, 1954. Entered into force January 15, 1954.

**United States Military Mission with the Imperial Iranian Gendarmerie.** TIAS 2946. Pub. 5488. 3 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Iran, renewing agreement of November 27, 1943, as amended. Exchange of notes—Signed at Tehran April 18, 1954. Entered into force April 18, 1954.

**Military Mission to Iran.** TIAS 2947. Pub. 5489. 3 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Iran, renewing agreement of October 6, 1947, as revised. Exchange of notes—Signed at Tehran April 18, 1954. Entered into force April 18, 1954.

**International Labor Organization, Certification of Able Seamen.** TIAS 2949. Pub. 5493. 14 pp. 10¢.

Convention between the United States and other governments—Adopted at Seattle June 29, 1946. Entered into force with respect to the United States of America April 9, 1954.

## INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES

### Calendar of Meetings <sup>1</sup>

#### Adjourned During July 1955

Commonwealth Agricultural Bureaux: Review Conference . . .	London . . . . .	June 8-July 7
U. N. Trusteeship Council: 16th Session . . . . .	New York . . . . .	June 8-July 22
ICAO Airworthiness Panel of Airworthiness Division: 2d Meeting.	Paris . . . . .	June 14-July 8
International Statistical Institute: 29th Session . . . . .	Quitandinha (Brazil) . . . . .	June 24-July 2
5th International Film Festival . . . . .	Berlin . . . . .	June 24-July 5
Geneva Air Show . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	June 24-July 15
ITU International Telegraph Consultative Committee (CCIT): Study Group VI.	Geneva . . . . .	June 28-July 13
Poznan International Fair . . . . .	Poznan (Poland) . . . . .	July 3-24
UNESCO—International Bureau of Education: 18th International Conference on Public Education.	Geneva . . . . .	July 4-12
ITU International Telegraph Consultative Committee (CCIT): Study Group X.	Geneva . . . . .	July 4-13
International Youth Gymnastic Congress . . . . .	Rotterdam . . . . .	July 5-9
ITU International Frequency Registration Board . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	July 6-15
Tripartite Working Group for Four-Power Conference . . . . .	Paris . . . . .	July 8-16
International Whaling Commission: 7th Meeting . . . . .	Moscow . . . . .	July 16-23
Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission: Annual Meeting . . . . .	Panama City . . . . .	July 14-15
Pan American Institute of Geography and History: Executive Committee.	México, D. F. . . . .	July 18-20
Conference of Heads of Government . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	July 18-23
International Union of Pure and Applied Chemistry: 18th Conference.	Zürich . . . . .	July 20-28
14th International Congress of Pure and Applied Chemistry . . . . .	Zürich . . . . .	July 21-27
American International Institute for the Protection of Childhood: Meeting of Directing Council.	Montevideo . . . . .	July 25-31
Consultative Committee on Rice: 10th Meeting . . . . .	Bangkok . . . . .	July 26-28
WMO Commission for Instruments and Methods of Observation: Working Group on Measurement of Precipitation.	Zürich . . . . .	July 26-29

#### In Session as of July 31, 1955

International Exhibition of Architecture, Industrial Design, Home Furnishings, and Crafts.	Hälsingborg (Sweden) . . . . .	June 10-
PAIGH 6th General Assembly . . . . .	México, D. F. . . . .	July 25-
PAIGH Commission on Cartography: 7th Consultation. . . . .	México, D. F. . . . .	July 25-
PAIGH Commission on Geography: 4th Consultation. . . . .	México, D. F. . . . .	July 25-
PAIGH Commission on History: 3d Consultation . . . . .	México, D. F. . . . .	July 25-

#### Scheduled August 1-October 31, 1955

3d International Congress of Biochemistry . . . . .	Brussels . . . . .	Aug. 1-
Advisory Committee to the U. N. Secretary-General on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy: 3d Meeting.	Geneva . . . . .	Aug. 3-
Fao Technical Advisory Committee on Desert Locust Control.	Damascus . . . . .	Aug. 4-
International Council of Scientific Unions: 7th General Assembly.	Oslo . . . . .	Aug. 8-
U.N. International Conference on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy.	Geneva . . . . .	Aug. 8-
Inter-American Indian Institute: Meeting of Governing Board.	México, D. F. . . . .	Aug. 8-
Fao Desert Locust Control Committee: 2d Session . . . . .	Damascus . . . . .	Aug. 14-
Conference of British Commonwealth Survey Officers . . . . .	Cambridge . . . . .	Aug. 15-
Edinburgh Film Festival . . . . .	Edinburgh . . . . .	Aug. 21-
Fao Meeting on Livestock Production under Tropical Conditions.	Brisbane (Australia) . . . . .	Aug. 22-

<sup>1</sup> Prepared in the Office of International Conferences, July 21, 1955. Following is a list of abbreviations: U.N., United Nations; ICAO, International Civil Aviation Organization; ITU, International Telecommunication Union; CCIT, International Telegraph Consultative Committee; UNESCO, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization; WMO, World Meteorological Organization; PAIGH, Pan American Institute of Geography and History; Fao, Food and Agriculture Organization; ECAFE, Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East; PASO, Pan American Sanitary Organization; WHO, World Health Organization; UNICEF, United Nations Children's Fund; ECE, Economic Commission for Europe; ILO, International Labor Organization; GATT, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade; ICEM, Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration.



## Calendar of Meetings—Continued

### Scheduled August 1–October 31, 1955—Continued

1st U.N. Congress on Prevention of Crime and Treatment of Offenders.	Geneva . . . . .	Aug. 22–
International Wool Textile Research Conference . . . . .	Sydney (Australia) . . . . .	Aug. 22–
U.N. ECAFE Iron and Steel Subcommittee: 6th Session . . . . .	Bangkok . . . . .	Aug. 24–
16th International Exhibition of Cinematographic Art . . . . .	Venice . . . . .	Aug. 25–
Inter-Parliamentary Union: 44th Congress . . . . .	Helsinki . . . . .	Aug. 25–
International Committee on Military Medicine and Pharmacy.	Istanbul . . . . .	Aug. 28–
International Astronomical Union: 9th General Assembly . . . . .	Dublin . . . . .	Aug. 29–
14th International Horticultural Congress . . . . .	Scheveningen (Netherlands) . . . . .	Aug. 29–
International Association for Hydraulic Research: 6th Plenary Meeting.	Delft (Netherlands) . . . . .	Aug. 29–
Consultative Committee for Economic Development in South-east Asia (Colombo Plan): Officials' Meeting.	Singapore . . . . .	Aug. 29–
U.N. Economic Commission for Latin America: 6th Session . . . . .	Bogotá . . . . .	Aug. 29–
ICAO 2d Air Navigation Conference . . . . .	Montreal . . . . .	Aug. 30–
UNESCO Seminar on Workers' Education . . . . .	Paris . . . . .	August–
ICAO Legal Committee: Subcommittee on Chartering and Hiring of Aircraft.	Paris or The Hague . . . . .	Sept. 1–
Baltic and North Sea Radiotelephone Conference . . . . .	Stockholm . . . . .	Sept. 1–
Damascus International Fair . . . . .	Damascus . . . . .	Sept. 2–
3d Pakistan International Industries Fair . . . . .	Karachi . . . . .	Sept. 2–
20th Salonika International Trade Fair . . . . .	Salonika . . . . .	Sept. 4–
International Commission for Criminal Police: 24th General Assembly.	Istanbul . . . . .	Sept. 5–
ICAO Diplomatic Conference for the Purpose of Finalizing the Protocol of Amendment of the Warsaw Convention.	The Hague . . . . .	Sept. 6–
PASO Executive Committee: 26th and 27th Meetings . . . . .	Washington . . . . .	Sept. 6–
International Scientific Tobacco Congress . . . . .	Paris . . . . .	Sept. 6–
PASO Directing Council: 8th Meeting; and WHO Regional Committee: 7th Meeting.	Washington . . . . .	Sept. 8–
UNICEF Executive Board and Program Committee . . . . .	New York . . . . .	Sept. 8–
19th Levant Fair . . . . .	Bari (Italy) . . . . .	Sept. 9–
International Rubber Study Group: Management Committee.	London . . . . .	Sept. 9–
International Congress on Cosmic Radiation . . . . .	México, D.F. . . . .	Sept. 10–
International Union of Public Transportation: 31st Congress.	Naples . . . . .	Sept. 11–
UNESCO International Congress of Libraries and Documentation Centers.	Brussels . . . . .	Sept. 11–
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and International Monetary Fund: 10th Annual Meeting of Boards of Governors.	Istanbul . . . . .	Sept. 12–
U.N. ECAFE Working Party of Experts on Hydrologic Terminology.	Bangkok . . . . .	Sept. 12–
U. N. ECE Timber Committee . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	Sept. 12–
WHO Regional Committee for Western Pacific: 6th Session . . . . .	Singapore . . . . .	Sept. 13–
U. N. Committee on Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories: Reconvened 6th Session.	New York . . . . .	Sept. 15–
Marseille International Fair . . . . .	Marseille . . . . .	Sept. 17–
2d International Technical and Industrial Exhibition . . . . .	Charleroi (Belgium) . . . . .	Sept. 17–
FAO International Chestnut Commission . . . . .	Rome . . . . .	Sept. 19–
9th Pan American Congress of Architects . . . . .	Caracas . . . . .	Sept. 19–
U.N. General Assembly: 10th Session . . . . .	New York . . . . .	Sept. 20–
U.N. ECE Coal Committee . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	Sept. 21–
FAO Near East Forestry Commission: 1st Session . . . . .	Teheran . . . . .	Sept. 24–
ILO Textiles Committee: 5th Session . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	Sept. 26–
U.N. ECE Conference of European Statisticians: 3d Plenary Session.	Geneva . . . . .	Sept. 26–
Committee for the Development of Trade, and East-West Trade Consultations.	Geneva . . . . .	Sept. 26–
International Conference on Regional Planning and Development.	London . . . . .	Sept. 28–
FAO Indo-Pacific Fisheries Council: 6th Session . . . . .	Tokyo . . . . .	Sept. 30–
FAO Latin American Forestry Commission: 5th Session . . . . .	Caracas . . . . .	Oct. 4–
ICAO Facilitation Division: 4th Session . . . . .	Manila . . . . .	Oct. 10–
FAO/ECE European Forestry Commission: 9th Session . . . . .	Rome . . . . .	Oct. 10–
South Pacific Commission: 14th Session . . . . .	Nouméa . . . . .	Oct. 10–
Postal Union of the Americas and Spain: 7th Congress . . . . .	Bogotá . . . . .	Oct. 12–
Consultative Committee for Economic Development in South-east Asia (Colombo Plan): Ministerial Meeting.	Singapore . . . . .	Oct. 17–
ILO Committee on Work on Plantations: 3d Session . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	Oct. 17–
Annual World Modern Pentathlon Championships . . . . .	Macolin (Switzerland) . . . . .	Oct. 21–
U.N. ECAFE Inland Waterway Subcommittee: 3d Session . . . . .	Dacca . . . . .	Oct. 24–
ICAO Pacific Regional Air Navigation Meeting . . . . .	Manila . . . . .	Oct. 27–
GATT Contracting Parties: 10th Session . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	Oct. 27–
FAO Council: 22d Session . . . . .	Rome . . . . .	Oct. 31–

## Calendar of Meetings—Continued

Scheduled August 1–October 31, 1955—Continued

FAO Committee on Commodity Problems: 26th Session . . .	Rome . . . . .	October
International North Pacific Fisheries Commission: 3d Meeting.	Tokyo . . . . .	October
Indian Industries Fair . . . . .	New Delhi . . . . .	October
ICEM Executive Committee: 3d Session . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	October or November
ICEM Council: 3d Session . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	October or November

## The United Nations and Equality for Women

### NINTH SESSION OF THE U.N. COMMISSION ON THE STATUS OF WOMEN

by Mrs. Lorena B. Hahn

The U.N. Commission on the Status of Women met for its ninth session in New York from March 14 to April 1, 1955. The 18 countries represented this year were Argentina, Australia, Byelorussia, China, Cuba, Dominican Republic, France, Haiti, Indonesia, Lebanon, Pakistan, Poland, Sweden, U.S.S.R., United Kingdom, United States, Venezuela, and Yugoslavia.

Almost all the delegates had had previous experience in the United Nations, more than half in the General Assembly or as members of permanent delegations to the United Nations. Miss Minerva Bernardino of the Dominican Republic was re-elected chairman for a third year. The delegate of Pakistan, Begum Anwar Ahmed, was elected first vice chairman, and the delegate of Poland, Mrs. Zofia Dembrinska, second vice chairman. Mrs. Agda Rossel of Sweden served as rapporteur.

As in previous years, the agenda of the Commission dealt principally with the status of women in regard to political rights, nationality, family law, equal pay for equal work, economic opportunities, and education for girls.

#### Interest in Technical Assistance

Recurring interest in technical assistance made this session of unusual interest. In the past year the United Nations has provided technical assistance for the first time for the specific purpose of

“improving the status of women” in response to a request from the Government of Pakistan. Assistance for this purpose had been approved by the General Assembly in 1953, on the understanding that the projects would be undertaken on a modest scale, making use of experts already on U.N. payrolls. The expert chosen to go to Pakistan was the chief of the Status-of-Women Section in the U.N. Secretariat, Mrs. Mary Tenison-Woods. The delegate of Pakistan expressed great appreciation for her service and told of further work planned by women in Pakistan on the basis of U.N. recommendations. Since I had myself seen something of this project last winter while traveling on a leadership grant from the Department of State, I had become aware of the eagerness in Pakistan to make the most of this aid from the United Nations and could add my personal observations to those of the Pakistan delegate.

Two of the resolutions adopted by the Status of Women Commission, on equal pay for equal work and educational opportunities for girls, urged greater use of technical assistance by governments. It was recognized that women also gain in status through projects in health, education, home economics, and similar efforts to raise living standards. The Commission approved unanimously a U.S. proposal that the United Nations prepare accounts of selected technical assistance projects through which women have benefited and

also a list of pamphlet and other U.N. materials on the status of women which might be useful to technical assistance experts.

#### **Contributions of Nongovernmental Organizations**

As in previous sessions, the Commission gained additional insight from statements of women's international nongovernmental organizations recognized as consultants by the Economic and Social Council. More than 30 such organizations had accredited representatives at the meeting, and many of these spoke on one or more of the agenda items.

During the past year these groups contributed to a document prepared for the Commission on methods used in campaigns for equal pay for equal work. This described activities in many countries, including the United States. The Commission invited organizations to supply further examples of such methods. It also asked for information on the activities of these groups in areas where women do not yet vote or have been granted the right to vote only in the past 5 years. This request was based on the observation that nongovernmental organizations play an important role in increasing the participation of women in public life and in establishing a climate of opinion favorable to the extension of political rights to women.

The contributions of the women's international organizations are invaluable to the work of the Commission on the Status of Women.

#### **Equal Suffrage**

On equal suffrage—always the first concern of this Commission—marked progress was reported in Colombia and Honduras, both of which have granted women the right to vote during the past year. In addition, it was noted that the women of Haiti voted for the first time last January, in a local election. The Haitian Constitution provides that after this first participation in local elections, women are eligible to vote also in national elections.

A major item on the agenda of the Commission this year was a proposed Convention on the Nationality of Married Women. A draft text for a convention had been proposed by Cuba 2 years ago and has since been twice circulated to governments for comment. This year the Commission considered a revised text and forwarded it to the Economic and Social Council with a recommenda-

tion that it be approved by the General Assembly. The proposed text provides that a woman marrying an alien shall not lose her nationality, nor automatically acquire his—a principle with which we agree.

However, the text also includes a specific clause which, if adopted, will give U.N. approval to the

#### **Publications on Status of Women**

*Following are some U.N. publications relating to the status of women which may be purchased directly from the International Documents Service, Columbia University Press, 2960 Broadway, New York 27, N. Y.:*

Report of the Commission on the Status of Women, Ninth Session - 25 cents

The Road to Equality (brief history of women suffrage) - 15 cents

Political Education of Women - 25 cents

The Education of Women for Citizenship (UNESCO publication) - \$1

Women and Education (in Yugoslavia, Chile, India - UNESCO publication) - \$1.75

practice of allowing an alien wife to be naturalized in a shorter time than an alien husband, a practice which may be regarded as discriminatory since it makes it more difficult for the wife to resist pressure to change her nationality. The United States proposed amending the text to forbid any distinction between men and women in matters of nationality. This amendment was in line with our laws and with the Inter-American Convention on the Nationality of Women, to which the United States and a number of other American Republics are already parties, but it lost by a vote of 7 to 8. The United States has advocated that nationality problems of women be considered by the International Law Commission of the United Nations in conjunction with the subject of nationality as a whole, on the basis of equality principles, in the hope that the standards eventually approved by the United Nations will accord with progress in this and various other countries.

#### **Equal Pay for Equal Work**

The discussion of equal pay for equal work opened with a statement by the delegate of the United Kingdom on recent action by her Govern-

ment to provide equal pay for women in the civil service. Salary scales for women are being brought in line with those in effect for men by increases in annual installments over a period of 7 years. An official committee had decided to recommend a similar plan to equalize teachers' salaries. Other speakers emphasized the difficulty of establishing equal pay standards in occupations employing only women. The need for training facilities, and for women to take advantage of them, was noted as an essential in helping women to qualify for equal pay.

The Commission also devoted major time to expanding economic opportunities for women. Two studies of considerable promise were presented by the International Labor Organization under this item of the agenda: one on the situation of older women workers,<sup>1</sup> and another on women's work in handicraft and cottage industries.<sup>2</sup> These studies supplemented each other in interest, since the problems of older women are of importance primarily in the industrially developed countries of Europe and North America, and cottage industries are found chiefly in less developed areas. The realization that in the United States and northern Europe the life expectancy for women is longer than for men, and that there are more women in the older age brackets, led to a discussion of the desirability of raising the customary age limits for employment. The ILO document described some of the efforts of communities in the United States to retrain older women for jobs, and the U.S. statement provided further information on efforts in this country, including action by the Federal and some State governments.

#### Educational Opportunities for Girls

How to improve educational opportunities for girls, and encourage girls to use these opportunities to their full capacity, is another topic to which the Commission gives attention each year. The U.N. Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization provided an analysis of secondary education for girls, showing that in other countries fewer girls than boys finish high school. The United States is an exception in this regard, since in this country more girls than boys graduate

from high school and continue into the first year of college. Reasons vary for the lag in girls' education in other countries. Lack of facilities is a major factor; among other factors are the greater cost of educating girls where free schools are lacking and the early age of marriage in some areas. It was observed that, where coeducation is usual, the enrollment of girls tends to equal that of boys. As noted above, the Commission urged greater use of technical assistance to help governments meet the problems involved.

Many of the actions of the Commission this year were approved unanimously. Additional resolutions were adopted on family law, increased recognition of women in appointments to the U.N. Secretariat and in government delegations, and procedural matters.

• *Mrs. Hahn, author of the above article, is U.S. Representative on the U.N. Commission on the Status of Women.*

## Current U.N. Documents: A Selected Bibliography<sup>1</sup>

### General Assembly

UNREF Executive Committee. UNREF Plan of Operations for 1955 submitted by the High Commissioner. A/AC.79/3, March 30, 1955. 102 pp. mimeo.

Information From Non-Self-Governing Territories: summary and analysis of information transmitted under article 73 e of the charter. Report of the Secretary-General. Summary of information transmitted by the Government of the United States of America. A/2895/Add.1, April 1, 1955. 35 pp. mimeo.

Information From Non-Self-Governing Territories: summary and analysis of information transmitted under article 73 e of the charter. Report of the Secretary-General. Summary of information transmitted by the Government of the United States of America. A/2895/Add.2, April 12, 1955. 20 pp. mimeo.

Administrative Tribunal Judgments. Participation of individuals in proceedings before the International Court of Justice. Memorandum submitted by the Secretary-General. A/AC.78/L.10, April 13, 1955. 13 pp. mimeo.

International Law Commission. Diplomatic intercourse and immunities. A/CN.4/91, April 21, 1955. 20 pp. mimeo.

International Law Commission. Law of treaties. Working paper prepared by the Secretariat. A/CN.4/L.55, May 10, 1955. 20 pp. mimeo.

Report of the Special Committee on Review of Administrative Tribunal Judgments. A/2909, June 10, 1955. 68 pp. mimeo.

<sup>1</sup> Printed materials may be secured in the United States from the International Documents Service, Columbia University Press, 2960 Broadway, New York 27, N. Y. Other materials (mimeographed or processed documents) may be consulted at certain designated libraries in the United States.

<sup>1</sup> U.N. doc. E/CN.6/262.

<sup>2</sup> U.N. doc. E/CN.6/267.



## Security Council

Report by the Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organization to the Secretary-General concerning complaints as to the observance of the General Armistice Agreement between Israel and Syria. S/3343, January 11, 1955. 19 pp. mimeo.

Letter dated 10 January 1955 from the Chairman of the Council of the Organization of American States addressed to the Secretary-General. S/3344, January 12, 1955. 14 pp. mimeo.

Letter dated 15 January 1955 from the Chairman of the Council of the Organization of American States addressed to the Secretary-General. S/3347, January 17, 1955. 7 pp. mimeo.

Letter dated 17 January 1955 from the Chairman of the Council of the Organization of American States addressed to the Secretary-General. S/3349, January 18, 1955. 50 pp. mimeo.

Letter dated 4 April 1955 from the Representative of Israel addressed to the President of the Security Council. S/3385, April 4, 1955. 4 pp. mimeo.

Letter dated 5 April 1955 from the Representative of Egypt addressed to the President of the Security Council. S/3386, April 5, 1955. 1 p. mimeo.

Letter dated 11 April 1955 from the Representative of Israel addressed to the President of the Security Council. S/3389, April 11, 1955. 2 pp. mimeo.

Letter dated 13 April 1955 from the Representative of the United States addressed to the President of the Security Council. S/3391, April 13, 1955. 21 pp. mimeo.

Report by the Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organization to the Secretary-General on the incidents between Egypt and Israel, since the Gaza incident of 28 February 1955. S/3300, April 14, 1955. 32 pp. mimeo.

## Economic and Social Council

Report of the Inter-American Commission of Women to the Ninth Session of the United Nations Commission on the Status of Women. E/CN.6/269, March 9, 1955. 40 pp. mimeo.

Forced Labour. Preliminary report by the Secretary-General of the United Nations and the Director-General of the International Labour Office. E/2699, March 14, 1955. 6 pp. mimeo.

Report of the Committee on the Enforcement of International Arbitral Awards. E/AC.42/4, March 21, 1955. 24 pp. mimeo.

Freedom of Information. Draft Convention on Freedom of Information. Note by the Secretary-General. E/2702, March 22, 1955. 1 p. mimeo.

Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Conference on the Status of Stateless Persons. E/2703, March 22, 1955. 2 pp. mimeo.

World Calendar Reform. Replies Received from Governments. Note by the Secretary-General. E/2701, March 22, 1955. 9 pp. mimeo.

Report of the Committee on the Enforcement of International Arbitral Awards. E/2704, E/AC.42/4/Rev. 1, March 28, 1955. 24 pp. mimeo.

International Assistance to Refugees Within the Mandate of the United Nations High Commissioner. Report of the Working Group. E/L.658, March 30, 1955. 3 pp. mimeo.

Economic Commission for Europe, Steel Committee. Recent advances in steel technology and market development, 1954. E/ECE/204(E/ECE/Steel/89), February 22, 1955. 55 pp. mimeo.

Freedom of information. Legal aspects of the rights and responsibilities of the media of information. Study by the Secretary-General. E/2698, March 14, 1955. 127 pp. mimeo.

Technical Assistance Committee. Summary financial report of the Executive Chairman of the Technical Assist-

ance Board to the Technical Assistance Committee on technical assistance activities during 1954. E/TAC/REP/34, March 15, 1955. 6 pp. mimeo.

Commission on Narcotic Drugs. Illicit traffic. Memorandum by the International Criminal Police Commission for 1954. E/CN.7/293, March 17, 1955. 42 pp. mimeo.

Full Employment. Implementation of full employment, economic development and balance of payments policies. Guatemala. E/2565/Add.15, March 21, 1955. 41 pp. mimeo.

Commission on Narcotic Drugs. The possibility of replacing hemp fibre and hempseed by other crops of similar industrial value or of developing narcotic-free strains of the cannabis plant. E/CN.7/297, March 24, 1955. 65 pp. mimeo.

Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East. Report of the Committee on Industry and Trade (seventh session) to the Commission (eleventh session). E/CN.11/404 (E/CN.11/I&T/115), March 25, 1955. 57 pp. mimeo.

Freedom of Information. Programme to promote among news personnel wider knowledge of United Nations, foreign countries and international affairs. E/2705, March 25, 1955. 28 pp. mimeo.

Commission on Narcotic Drugs. A programme of studies on the cannabis plant and its products. E/CN.7/286/Add.7, March 30, 1955. 17 pp. mimeo.

Commission on Narcotic Drugs. Problem of synthetic narcotic drugs. Synthetic substances with morphine-like effect. Relationship between chemical structure and analgesic action. E/CN.7/299, March 30, 1955. 71 pp. mimeo.

Social Commission. International survey of programmes of social development. E/CN.5/301, March 31, 1955. 591 pp. mimeo.

Economic Commission for Latin America. Progress report by the Executive Secretary. E/CN.12/AC.26/2, March 31, 1955. 29 pp. mimeo.

Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East. Report by the Food and Agriculture Organization. Annex A. FAO activities in the field of surplus disposal. E/CN.11/401 Annex A, April 1, 1955. 11 pp. mimeo.

## TREATY INFORMATION

## Current Actions

### MULTILATERAL

#### Austria

State treaty for the re-establishment of an independent and democratic Austria. Signed at Vienna May 15, 1955.

*Ratifications deposited:* U.S.S.R., July 5, 1955; United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, July 19, 1955; France, July 27, 1955.

*Entered into force:* July 27, 1955.

#### Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration

Constitution of the Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration. Adopted at Venice October 19, 1953. Entered into force November 30, 1954.

*Acceptances deposited:* Belgium, April 27, 1955; Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, April 27, 1955; New Zealand, April 27, 1955.

#### Postal Matters

Universal postal convention, with final protocol, annex, regulations of execution, and provisions regarding air-mail and final protocol thereto. Signed at Brussels July 11, 1952. Entered into force July 1, 1953. TIAS 2800. *Ratifications deposited:* Spain for the Spanish colonies and Spanish Zone of Morocco, May 17, 1955; Yugoslavia, June 21, 1955.

#### Weather

Convention of the World Meteorological Organization. Done at Washington October 11, 1947. Entered into force March 23, 1950. TIAS 2052.

*Accession deposited:* Jordan, July 11, 1955.

### BILATERAL

#### Belgium

Agreement concerning the participation of the Belgian forces in United Nations operations in Korea. Signed at Washington July 15, 1955. Entered into force July 15, 1955.

#### China

Agreement for cooperation concerning civil uses of atomic energy. Signed at Washington July 18, 1955. Entered into force July 18, 1955.

#### Colombia

Agreement for cooperation concerning civil uses of atomic energy. Signed at Washington July 19, 1955. Entered into force July 19, 1955.

#### France

Agreement amending the agreement for financing certain educational exchange programs of October 22, 1948, as amended (TIAS 1877 and 3031). Effected by exchange of notes at Paris June 30, 1955. Entered into force June 30, 1955.

Agreement regarding the transport, burial and embalming of bodies of members of United States Forces dying in France. Signed at Paris July 1, 1955. Entered into force July 1, 1955.

#### Greece

Agricultural commodities agreement relating to the sale of such commodities to be used for grants to Greece for the promotion of economic development. Signed at Athens June 24, 1955. Entered into force June 24, 1955.

Agricultural commodities agreement relating to the sale of such commodities to be used for loans to Greece to promote economic development. Signed at Athens June 24, 1955. Entered into force June 24, 1955.

Agreement relating to the importation of certain personal effects and equipment by American personnel in Greece under the military facilities agreement. Effected by exchange of notes at Athens June 27, 1955. Entered into force June 27, 1955.

#### Italy

Agreement amending the agreement for financing certain educational exchange programs of December 18, 1948, as amended (TIAS 1864 and 3148). Effected by exchange of notes at Rome April 22 and June 30, 1955. Entered into force June 30, 1955.

#### Japan

Agreement relating to a program of aircraft assembly or manufacture in Japan. Effected by exchange of notes at Tokyo June 3, 1955. Entered into force June 3, 1955.

#### Lebanon

Agreement for cooperation concerning civil uses of atomic energy. Signed at Washington July 18, 1955. Entered into force July 18, 1955.

#### Libya

Agreement amending the agreement of September 9, 1954 (TIAS 3105) relating to economic aid. Effected by exchange of notes May 6 and 30, 1955. Entered into force May 30, 1955.

#### Netherlands

Agreement concerning a special program of facilities assistance pursuant to the mutual defense assistance agreement of January 27, 1950 (TIAS 2015). Effected by exchange of notes at The Hague April 29, 1955. Entered into force provisionally April 29, 1955.

*Entered into force (definitively):* July 1, 1955 (upon notification given the United States by the Netherlands that constitutional approval has been obtained by the Netherlands).

Agreement to facilitate the interchange of patent rights and technical information for defense purposes, with exchange of notes. Signed at The Hague April 29, 1955. Entered into force provisionally April 29, 1955.

*Entered into force (definitively):* July 13, 1955 (upon notification given the United States by the Netherlands that constitutional approval has been obtained by the Netherlands).

Agreement for cooperation concerning civil uses of atomic energy. Signed at Washington July 18, 1955. Enters into force on the day of receipt by the United States of notification from the Netherlands that constitutional approval has been obtained by the Netherlands.

#### Peru

Agreement amending the agreement regarding surplus agricultural commodities of February 7, 1955 (TIAS 3190). Signed at Lima June 25, 1955. Entered into force June 25, 1955.

#### Spain

Agreement supplementing the facilities assistance program agreement of April 9, May 11 and 19, 1954 (TIAS 3098), by providing for extension of the program. Effected by exchange of notes at Madrid May 25, 1955. Entered into force May 25, 1955.

Agreement for cooperation concerning civil uses of atomic energy. Signed at Washington July 19, 1955. Entered into force July 19, 1955.

#### Switzerland

Agreement for cooperation relating to the sale and purchase of an atomic research reactor. Signed at Washington July 18, 1955. Entered into force July 18, 1955.

#### United Kingdom

Agreement supplementing the facilities assistance program agreement of June 8 and 15, 1954 (TIAS 2998), by providing for extension of the program. Effected by exchange of notes at London June 27, 1955. Entered into force June 27, 1955.

#### Venezuela

Agreement for cooperation concerning civil uses of atomic energy. Signed at Washington July 21, 1955. Entered into force July 21, 1955.

August 1, 1955

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Releases may be obtained from the News Division, Department of State, Washington 25, D. C.

Press releases issued prior to July 18 which appear in this issue of the BULLETIN are Nos. 431 and 433 of July 15.

No.	Date	Subject
435	7/18	Eisenhower: opening statement at Geneva.
*436	7/18	Atomic agreement with China.
*437	7/18	Harrington nomination.
*438	7/18	Atomic agreement with Netherlands.
*439	7/18	Atomic agreement with Lebanon.
440	7/19	Murphy: statement on Nato Status of Forces Agreement.
*441	7/18	Atomic agreement with Switzerland.
*442	7/19	Atomic agreement with Colombia.
*443	7/19	Atomic agreement with Spain.
*444	7/21	Atomic agreement with Portugal.
*445	7/21	Atomic agreement with Venezuela.
†446	7/21	Delegation to U.N. Congress on Crime Prevention (rewrite).
*447	7/21	Educational exchange.
†448	7/22	Proclamation on accession of Japan to GATT.
†449	7/23	U.S. delegation to atomic energy conference (rewrite).
*450	7/23	Hoover: death of Cordell Hull.

\*Not printed.

†Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.



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